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DES AND A PROPOSED THEORY OF ENTERPRISE LIABIUTY
I. INTRODUCTION
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a man-made estrogen,' first approved by the
Federal Drug Administration (FDA) in 1947 for use in complications during
pregnancy-specifically, to prevent miscarriages. 2 Between the years 1947
1. Estrogen is a female sex hormone, first isolated for medical use in 1923. It was found useful
in the treatment of women whose disorders were believed to stem from low natural levels of
estrogen. DES was first synthesized in England in 1938, but was never patented. Its use
represented a major advance over that of natural estrogens because DES was cheaper and could
be administered orally and less painfully. Defendants' Joint Brief in Support of Their Joint
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2-3, Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 74-030-070 NP (Mich.
Cir. Ct. May 16, 1977) (motion granted) [hereinafter cited as Abel, Defendants' Brief].
2. Id. at 4. Two medical sources in the 1940's were primarily responsible for the belief that
DES would significantly reduce the incidence of threatened abortions, namely Karnaky, 7he Use
of Stilbestrol for the Treatment of Threatened and Habitual Abortion and Premature Labor: A
Preliminary Report, 35 S. Med. J. 838 (1942), and Smith, Diethylstilbestrol in the Prevention and
Treatment of Complications of Pregnancy, 56 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynec. 821 (1948). Both of these
studies were soon criticized for their lack of adequate controls, and subsequent controlled studies
failed to substantiate these earlier claims of effectiveness. See, e.g., Davis & Fugo, Steroids in the
Treatment of Early Pregnancy Complications, 142 J.A.M.A. 778 (1950); Dieckmann, Davis,
Rynkiewicz & Pottinger, Does the Administration of Diethylstilbestrol During Pregnancy Have
Therapeutic Value?, 66 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynec. 1062 (1953); Robinson & Shettles, Tire Use of
Diethylstilbestrol in Threatened Abortion, 63 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynec. 1330 (1952). Nevertheless,
DES continued to be manufactured and prescribed for the prevention of abortions until 197 1. See
notes 11-12 infra and accompanying text.
The drug is still marketed in the United States for a wide variety of other purposes. It is used in
the treatment of women for menopausal disturbances, senile vaginitis, and the relief of breast
engorgement during lactation suppression. Men are treated with it for cancer of the prostate. A.
Osol & R. Pratt, The United States Dispensatory 420-21 (27th ed. 1973); Physicians' Desk
Reference 951 (31st ed. 1977). DES is also an ingredient of the "morning-after" pill used to
prevent pregnancy. M. Dixon, Drug Product Liability § 11.27 (1977).
DES is also used in animal feed and drugs as a growth promoter. As early as 1959, the FDA
withdrew approval of the use of DES in chicken feed on the ground that it was a known
carcinogen. This FDA order was approved by the courts. See Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177 (7th
Cir. 1966). DES, however, has continued to be used in animal drugs and feed. See Environmen-
tal Carcinogenesis: Regulation on the Frontiers of Science, 7 Envt'l L. 83, 101 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Environmental Carcinogenesis]. This situation has arisen because of an exception to the
Delaney Amendment, which in general bans the use of unsafe food additives and specifically of
carcinogens. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1970). A clause added to this section in 1962, known as the
"DES clause," allows such additives in animal feed if no residue of the additive can be found in
the animal tissues. Id.; see Hess & Clark v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Although
DES was excluded from the reach of the Delaney Amendment by this clause at the time it was
added, by the early 1970's new and more sensitive tests were able to detect the presence of DES
in the tissue of animals that had ingested it. Id. Nevertheless, because of procedural ir-
regularities, the court in Hess & Clark set aside a 1972 attempt to ban the use of DES in animal
drugs. Id. at 994-95. Rather than report back to the court for further action, the FDA has chosen
to wait for the results of experiments on the threshold level of DES. Environmental Car-
cinogenesis, supra at 101. For discussion of the threshold level of DES, see Gass, A Discussion
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and 1971, DES was manufactured by hundreds of drug companies3 and
popularly prescribed for millions of pregnant women. 4 In 1971, the medical
literature reported a statistically significant association between the use of
DES, or of chemically similar synthetic estrogens manufactured during the
same period, and the subsequent development of cancer in the users'
daughters, exposed to the drug in utero. 5 A small percentage of the estimated
of Assay Sensitivity Methodology and Carcinogenic Potential, 30 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 111
(1975); Schmidt, The Benefit-Risk Equation, FDA Consumer, May 1974, at 27, 29-30. Unlike the
United States, by 1973 twenty-three countries had banned DES in cattlefeed pending further
testing. Drugs-DES Revisited, 9-10 Trial Magazine, Mar./Apr. 1973, at 44.
3. No one is certain of exactly which companies manufactured DES for use in pregnancy, or
of how many companies were involved. In one DES case, defendants mentioned 300 companies.
See Abel, Defendants' Brief, supra note 1, at 51. An attorney connected with the DES litigation
explained that the 300 companies include distributors and packagers of DES as well as
manufacturers. Interview with Henry Simon, counsel in some of the DES litigation for one of the
defendant drug companies, in New York City (May 26, 1977). Thus, not all of the 300 are DES
ftanufacturers. In the cases where plaintiffs are represented by Kolsby, Wolf & Gordon and
where a number of DES manufacturers are joined as defendants because the plaintiffs cannot
identify the manufacturer of the injury-producing product, plaintiffs, in an attempt to be
inclusive, initially joined 94 DES manufacturers. See notes 26-27 infra and accompanying text.
This number is based on an FDA computer printout of every company for which the FDA
approved a New Drug Application (N.D.A.) for DES for use in accidents of pregnancy, or In a
dosage suitable for such use. However, this printout did not include information on those
companies which were allowed to market DES without an N.D.A. after it was no longer a new
drug. More important, the printout did not include information on drugs manufactured simulta-
neously with DES and having the same purpose and effect. Interview with Herbert Kolsby,
Kolsby, Wolf & Gordon, in Philadelphia (Aug. 17, 1977). Consequently, it can only be estimated
that the number of firms which manufactured DES for use in pregnancy is between 94 and 300.
4. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1977, at 16, col. 2. An indication of the popularity of the drug can
be found in the medical literature. "The public has been so frequently told of the virtue of this
drug through articles appearing in lay journals that it now requires a courageous physician to
refuse this medication. The mass of pharmaceutical literature, extolling the wonders of this drug,
has also rendered most practitioners amenable to his patient's [sic] demands. This situation,
together with the understandable desire to do something positive toward rescuing a teetering
pregnancy, has resulted in the widespread use of diethylstilbestrol in threatened abortion."
Robinson & Shettles, supra note 2, at 1330; see M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 11.27.
5. Greenwald, Barlow, Nasca & Burnett, Vaginal Cancer After Maternal Treatment with
Synthetic Estrogens, 285 N. Eng. J. Med. 390 (1971); Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocar-
cinoma of the Vagina, 284 N. Eng. J. Med. 878 (1971). Scientists discovered the link between
DES and cancer by noting a sudden increase in incidence of a rare form of cancer and then by
taking highly detailed histories of the women exhibiting this disease, including maternal ingestion
of drugs. Id. at 878-79. Subsequent studies of the same nature have confirmed this original
finding, e.g., Nordqvist, Fidler, Woodruff & Lewis, Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Cervix and
Vagina, 37 Cancer 858 (1976). Studies are still being conducted. See note 11 inlfra. Recent
research has also revealed an apparent link between use of DES during pregnancy and structural
and functional changes in the genital tracts of the sons of such women. These changes may include
reduced fertility. Gill, Schumacher & Bibbo, Structural and Functional Abnormalilies in the Sex
Organs of Male Offspring of Mothers Treated with Diethylstilbestrol (DES), 16 J. Reprod. Med.
147, 152-53 (1976).
Scientists frequently assume causation on the basis of statistical data like that in the DES
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one-half million or more6 DES daughters are presently suffering from clear-
cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and uterus,7 heretofore rare8 and some-
times fatal9 forms of cancer. The vast majority have other abnormalities,
which may be pre-cancerous.10 In 1971, the FDA, contraindicating DES for
studies. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 579, 600-02 (1965). However, the
phrase "significant association," Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra at 879, denotes that a
cause-and-effect relationship does not necessarily follow from such a statistical relationship. In an
absolute sense, the causation of cancer could only be established through an understanding of the
scientific mechanism whereby the introduction of a substance into the body creates a tumor. This
is not understood in the case of DES. M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 4.04[l 1]. Neither is it understood
in any instance of environmentally caused cancer. Environmental Carcinogenesis, supra note 2, at
94-96. Because of the variance between a medical acceptance of statistical data as indicative of
causation, and the more absolute requirements of a legal cause-in-fact, see Gordon, supra at
600-02, plaintiffs in the DES cases may encounter difficulties. Nevertheless, courts have found
liability in other cases of environmentally caused cancer. See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestosis and mesothelioma); Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (Sth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (asbestosis).
In view of the rarity of the forms of cancer associated with DES in any persons other than DES
daughters, see note 8 infra, it should not be difficult for a court to find a legal causal relationship
between DES and cancer.
6. Ulfelder, The Stilbestrol-Adenosis-Carcinoma Syndrome, 38 Cancer 426. 429 (1976). The
author states that this estimate is conservative. See N.Y. Times. May 17, 1977 at 18, col. 3
(estimating 3 million women whose mothers took DES during pregnancy).
7. Estimates of the incidence of adenocarcinoma in DES-exposed daughters vary from one in
250 to one, in 1000. B. Seaman, Women and the Crisis in Sex Hormones 29 (1977). One doctor
noted for his DES research recently estimated that incidence might be as low as one in 10,000.
Wall St. J., May 17, 1977, at 13, col. 1.
A nationwide registry for cases of clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the genital tract was established
soon after the link between this disease and DES was established. By 1975 two hundred and fifty
cases had been reported to it. Two-thirds of all cases had a confirmed exposure to DES; for
vaginal adenocarcinoma, the confirmed exposure was over 80%. Ulfelder, supra note 6, at 428.
However, exposure to DES, and sometimes even the development of adenocarcinoma, can be
asymptomatic. DESAD Project, Div. of Cancer Control and Rehabilitation, Nat'l Cancer Inst. &
Office of Cancer Communications, NCI, Questions and Answers About DES Exposure Before
Birth 6-7 (Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare Pub. No. (NIH) 76-1118) [hereinafter cited as
Questions]. Also, routine gynecological examinations will not disclose DES exposure. Herbst,
Scully & Robboy, Problems in the Examination of the DES-Exposed Female, 46 Obstet. &
Gynecol. 353, 354 (1975). Therefore, it is to be expected that actual incidence of DES-related
adenocarcinoma is higher than reported.
8. Clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the cervix had been infrequently reported before the DES-
cancer linked cases; only three cases of clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina had ever been
recorded before. Ulfelder, supra note 6, at 428.
9. Of 154 cases treated by the preferred methods of surgery or radiation, 37 (24%) had
recurrences and 24 (16%) of these died, although the follow-up period was less than two years in
one-third of the cases. Herbst, Robboy, Scully & Poskanzer, Clear-Cell Adenocarcinoma of the
Vagina and Cervix in Girls: Analysis of 170 Registry Cases, 119 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynec. 713, 720
(1974).
10. The most consistently present abnormality is adenosis, which is "tissue placed abnormally
on the cervix or vagina." Questions, supra note 7, at 3. The FDA requires the following warning
for those forms of DES and related drugs which are still sold: "Vaginal adenosis has been
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use by pregnant women, effectively banned it for this purpose both because of
its danger'1  and ineffectiveness.1 2
Several hundred daughters,' 3 some with cancer and some with possibly
reported in 30% to 90% of postpubertal girls . . whose mothers received diethylstilbestrol or a
closely related congener during pregnancy. . . .The significance of this finding with respect to
potential for development of vaginal adenocarcinoma is unknown. Periodic examination of such
patients is recommended." 40 Fed. Reg. 32,773 (1975).
11. In view of the dangers of DES, in 1971 the FDA took the following three steps: "1. All
manufacturers of DES or closely related congeners (dienestrol, hexestrol, benzestrol, promethes-
trol) are being notified that appropriate changes will be required in the labeling for such drugs.
This change will consist in the listing of pregnancy a; a contraindication to the use of
diethylstilbestrol and the other above-mentioned compounds. 2. All other estrogens will be
required to have the following WARNING in their labeling: 'A statistically significant association
has been reported between maternal ingestion during pregnancy of diethylstilbestrol and the
occurrence of vaginal carcinoma developing years later in the offspring. Whether such an
association is applicable to all estrogens is not known at this time. In any event, estrogens are not
indicated for use during pregnancy.' 3. Epidemiological studies are being initiated to determine
the true incidence of this disease in young women ...and the probability of a cause-and-effect
relationship." U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Drug Bull., Diethylstilbestrol Contraindicated in Pregnancy (Nov. 1971). For current contraindi-
cations and warnings for DES, see Physicians Desk Reference, supra note 2, at 951, and A. Osol
& R. Pratt, supra note 2, at 420-21. The epidemiological studies referred to are in progress,
supported by the National Cancer Institute in cooperation with Massachusetts General Hospital,
University of Southern California, Baylor College of Medicine, and the Mayo Clinic. Letter from
Robert Avery, Jr., Head Public Inquiries Section, Office of Cancer Communications, Dep't of
Health, Education, and Welfare (Mar. 7, 1977).
12. Early studies indicated that DES might not be effective for the prevention of miscar-
riages. See note 2 supra. However, the drug laws of 1938 only required drug manufacturers to
submit proof of safety to the FDA. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, §
505(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (1938). The 1962 amendment to the Act required proof of effectiveness as
well. Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 781 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355
(1970)). In the late 1960's, the FDA sponsored a study to review the effectiveness of all drugs
approved by it prior to 1962. This study gave drugs one of four possible ratings: "effective,"
"probably effective," "possibly effective," and "ineffective." National Research Council, National
Academy of Sciences, Drug Efficacy Study 7 (1969). "Possibly effective" was defined to mean
"there is little evidence of effectiveness under any of the criteria stated ...."Id. at 42. In 1971,
DES and several related drugs received a "possibly effective" rating for the indication "[plreven-
tion of accidents of pregnancy." Although at that time drug., could still be sold for the "possibly
effective" indication, because of the known dangers of DES it was also contraindicated. 36 Fed.
Reg. 21,537 (1971). Subsequently, drugs rated "possibly effective" were no longer allowed to be
sold for such indications. 38 Fed. Reg. 26,824 (1973).
13. Interview with Henry Simon, counsel in some of the DES litigation for one of the
defendant drug companies, in New York City (May 26, 1977). A Michigan suit alone, currently
on appeal, involves 144 women as plaintiffs. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1977, at 18, col. 3. The
number of women involved in the DES cases is greater than this estimate if one includes those
women who could be affected by the pending class action suits. E.g., Tigue v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., No. 3838/76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Mar. 1976). (This suit was originally captioned
Boxer v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. Although the class action is still continuing, plaintiff Ronnie
Boxer's action has been severed and is now Boxer v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 3838/76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 13, 1977) (caption amended).)
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pre-cancerous conditions, 14 are plaintiffs in an estimated eighty to one hun-
dred DES cases presently pending in the United States.' s Most of the major
drug companies are defendants. 16 Plaintiffs allege that defendants in-
sufficiently tested DES and sold it without warning, when they knew or
should have known it was both ineffective and unsafe for use by pregnant
women.1 7 It should be noted that under present law, even a cause of action in
strict liability in the area of drugs apparently sets a negligence standard for
tortious behavior-that the manufacturer knew or should have known his
product was dangerous.' 8 Only one of the DES cases, Barros v. E.R. Squibb
14. A defendant's attorney in some of the DES cases states that the majority of the women in
the DES cases have adenosis rather than cancer. Interview with Henry Simon, counsel for one of
the defendant drug companies, in New York City (Feb. 23, 1978). It is not known how serious
adenosis is. See note 10 supra. A number of plaintiffs who do not have cancer have nevertheless
undergone surgery. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1977, at 18, col. 3. Many of the DES plaintiffs do have
cancer. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1977, at 16, col. 2 (describing plaintiffs in Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. 74-030-070 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 16, 1977)); N.Y. Times, May 17, 1977, at 18. col. 3
(same); Interview with Herbert Kolsby, Kolsby, Wolf & Gordon, in Philadelphia (Aug. 17, 1977)
(describing the plaintiffs whom he is representing).
15. Interview with Henry Simon, counsel in some of the DES litigation for one of the
defendant drug companies, in New York City (May 26, 1977).
16. For example, the 16 companies which are defendants in the Michigan suit include: Lilly,
Upjohn, Squibb, Merck, Schering, and Abbott. Wall St. J., May 17, 1977, at 13, col. 1. All of
these companies are listed among the 500 largest U.S. industrial corporations of 1976. Fortune,
May 1977, at 364.
17. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Joint Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment at 1, 6, Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 74-030-070 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 16, 1977)
(motion granted) [hereinafter cited as Abel, Plaintiffs' Brief].
18. This negligence standard in products liability is, of course, based on the requirement that
liability for negligent behavior is imposed only when the risk is foreseeable. W. Prosser, Law of
Torts § 31 (4th ed. 1971). In a suit against a drug manufacturer for negligence, it is consequently
important to determine at what point in time the manufacturer knew or should have known that
his product was dangerous. E.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 448, 451
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 270 Or.
375, 390, 528 P.2d 522, 530 (1974). In strict liability one would expect a more stringent standard,
since under the Restatement strict liability applies although "the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation of his product. . . ." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
However, an exception has been created for "[u]navoidably unsafe products .... which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use." Id. § 402A, Comment k (italics deleted). The exception applies particularly to
drugs. Id. The sale of such products may be justified because their benefit appears to outweigh
their risk; hence they are not defective if accompanied by a proper warning. Id. In the case of
new or experimental drugs, the seller should not be held strictly liable "for unfortunate
consequences . . . merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable isk." Id. In such
cases, a warning is required only "where the situation calls for it." Id. The courts, in general,
have interpreted this to mean that a manufacturer only becomes liable for a defective drug where
he fails to warn of its danger after such time as he knew or should have known of this danger,
even though he is sued under strict liability or warranty. (In warranty, the standard applied is
generally the same as strict liability.) E.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 424-27 (2d
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& Sons, Inc., 19 has gone to trial, resulting in a verdict for the defendant.
However, the verdict was based on the jury's failure to accept the plaintiff's
identification of the injury-producing product °20 Thus, this case does not
indicate whether future DES defendants will be found liable under the
negligence standard. If the drug companies are found liable in future cases,
damages are estimated in the billions. 2
1
A number of legal problems face the plaintiffs in these cases: class action
certification, 2 2 running of the statute of limitations in jurisdictions without a
Cir. 1969) (warranty and strict liability under 402A); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d
121, 127-29 (9th Cir. 1968) (warranty held same standard as strict liability under 402A); Cudmore
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 643-44 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1003 (1967) (same standard for negligence and implied warranty). Several commentators
have urged that, under strict liability, scienter should be supplied by law and the manufacturer
should be liable, especially in the area of drugs, even if the danger was unknowable at the time of
manufacture or use. Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 131,
140-41, 144 (1972); Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23
Sw. L.J. 256, 268-69 (1969); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 834-35, 844-45 (1973). There is some indication in the courts of movement toward such
a stricter standard in both strict liability and warranty. E.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943. (1964) (after certification to Florida
Supreme Court, held that cigarette manufacturer's actual or constructive knowledge is irrelevant
to liability for cancer in implied warranty); Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432,
443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating good test under implied
warranty would be that a reasonable man would not have sold the drug if he had known of Its
danger); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1090, 1106-09 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (test under strict
liability is to assume seller knew of drug's danger); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, Div. of
Sterling Drug, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1974) (in suit for death resulting from ad-
diction to drug, court stated: "[Slome products... are so dangerous, in fact that the manufactur-
ers should be liable for resulting harm though he did not and could not have known of the
dangers at the time of marketing."). This issue will be an important one in the DES cases. See
note 25 infra and accompanying text.
19. No. 75-1226 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1978).
20. In Barros, the plaintiff's mother identified Squibb as the manufacturer of the particular
form of DES that she took during her pregnancy. The jury returned answers to interrogatories
with their general verdict for the defendant. They were unanimous in concluding that it was not
proved that plaintiff's mother had received Squibb's product. This was the dispositive fact in
their verdict. The jury was also asked whether negligence or strict liability applied to defendants'
manufacture of DES and on both these issues the jury was split. The jury's answers to these two
questions are part of the court record, but since they could have had no effect on the verdict in
Barros, they are merely indicative of possible future jury decisions. Telephone interview with
Herbert Kolsby, plaintiff's attorney in Barros (Jan. 31, 1978).
21. In one class action suit, plaintiffs have asked for over one billion dollars in damages.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1976, at 16, col. 7. In the Michigan case currently on appeal, the damages
sought are about $625 million. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1977, at 16, col. 2.
22. Class action suits comprise some of the numerous DES cases. Several of these suits have
already encountered difficulties related to their class action status. E.g., Rheingold v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 74 Civil 3420 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975) (dismissed for lack of
standing of named plaintiff); Stack v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. GD 77-05944 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
June 30, 1977) (striking class action allegations).
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The principal problem DES class actions will encounter is the requirement for common
questions of law and fact among class members. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Law § 901(a)(2) (McKinney 1976). Defendants will claim that individual questions of fact
predominate, including injury, the administration of other drugs to plaintiffs' mothers, statutes of
limitations, time of marketing and degree of knowledge about the danger of DES at that time,
and the defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. See, e.g., Motion To
Refuse Class Action Certification at 3-5, Stack v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. GD 77-05944
(Pa. Ct. C.P. June 30, 1977) (striking class action allegations). Damages will also vry %4ddely
among plaintiffs. For reasons like these, no class actions have been certified in cases of personal
injury in products liability suits. Recently, however, courts have allowed products liability class
actions for property damage. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94
Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971) (refund requested for fraudulent misrepresentation on freezers); Anthony v.
General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1973) (replacement of defective
truck wheels requested); Metowski v. Traid Corp., 28 Cal. App. 3d 332, 104 Cal. Rptr. 599
(1972) (refund requested of difference between actual and represented value of defective cameras);
Landesman v. General Motors Corp., 42 11. App. 3d 363, 356 N.E.2d 105 (1976) (correction of
defective motor mounts requested). Contra, Edelman v. Lee Optical Co., 24 Il. App. 3d 216, 320
N.E.2d 517 (1974) (class certification to buyers of defective eyeglasses improper because individ-
ual reliance varies); Gilmore v. General Motors Corp., 35 Ohio Misc. 36, 300 N.E.2d 259 (Ct.
C.P. 1973) (class certification denied to owners of defective cars). Unlike personal injury actions,
damages were identical or nearly so in these cases. See, e.g., Metowski v. Traid Corp., 28 Cal.
App. 3d at 338, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 602. Also the amount of damages made it unlikely that
individual actions would be brought if class actions were not certified. See, e.g., Vasquez v.
Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d at 810, 484 P.2d at 970, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 802. Because the DES cases
have so many individual variations of fact and there is less need for class certification, it is
expected they will have difficulty obtaining class certification.
It should be noted, however, that class actions for personal injury and wrongful death have
been certified under Federal Rule 23 in the case of mass disasters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
Certification has been limited to those issues where the courts believed common questions of law
and fact predominated and uniformity of result would ensue. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Motor
Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975) (mass food
poisoning-certification restricted to issue of defendants' negligence); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp.,
350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (airline collision-certification restricted to liability and
damages excluded). Since the DES cases are in some senses like a mass disaster, although there is
obviously greater uniformity in accidents arising from one incident, these cases do offer hope for
class certification in the DES cases, at least on the issue of liability.
If class actions were to be allowed in the DES cases, an interesting problem would arise in
those suits that are class actions against multiple defendants. See note 28 infra and accompanying
text. There is agreement among the courts that, where the named plaintiff has a cause of action
against one defendant, he may not initiate a class action suit on behalf of members of a class,
each of whom was injured by some one of the defendants joined because they were all engaged in
a like practice. This is because the named plaintiff is not representative of the class, since each
member of the class was injured by a different defendant. (Some courts have termed this a lack of
standing.) See, e.g., La Mar v. H. & B. Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973); Leonard
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Weiner v. Bank
of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Phillips v. Crocker-Citizens Natl Bank, 38
Cal. App. 3d 901, 113 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1974). But cf. Haas v. Pittsburgh Natl Bank, 526 F.2d
1083, 1095-96 (3d Cir. 1975) (addition of named plaintiff having cause of action against the other
defendant cures defect). The DES suits differ from these cases, however, in that each plaintiff is
pleading a cause of action against all defendants, among whom there is alleged to be a common
bond. See pts. III & IV infra. There is support in the language of the cases for the proposition
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broad discovery rule,23 possible absence of a cause of action for fetal injury
that a conspiracy or concerted action among the defendants, giving the named plaintiff a cause of
action against them all, would make class certification permissible. See, e.g., La Mar v. H. & B.
Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d at 469-70; Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 37
Cal. App. 3d 193, 201, 112 Cal. Rptr. 144, 150 (1974).
23. The statute of limitations rules relating to discovery vary so greatly from state to state and
even within a single state that it is almost impossible to make any generalizations. The basic
problem is determining when the cause of action accrued and the statute began to run In the case
of an injury which was undiscovered for a length of time because its effects were delayed. The
issue is whether the injury occurred at the time of initial contact with the causative agent or when
the effect of such contact was or should have been discovered. This is an essential distinction for
the DES plaintiffs because it may be twenty years or more before the carcinogenic effects of the
drug become manifest. See Environmental Carcinogenesis, supra note 2, at 83. It is not known
how long DES daughters remain subject to risk. Questions, supra note 7, at 7. Even daughters
with diagnosed adenocarcinoma may not learn of the relativnship between DES and their illness
until after diagnosis.
Some jurisdictions have adopted a strict rule that the cause of action accrues at the time of the
original contact, because some damage occurred immediately, although the plaintiff was unaware
of it. See, e.g., Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d .250 (1963); Schwartz v. Heyden
Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, modified, 12
N.Y.2d 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963). By judicial
or statutory exception, however, the statute begins to run from time of discovery in some of these
jurisdictions when a foreign object has been introduced into the body, usually through medical
means. See, e.g., Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 201, 290 N.E.2d 916, 918
(1972); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1977). The objects which are considered
foreign are subject to wide variation. See, e.g., Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392
(D.N.H. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1977) (pill like a foreign object) (applying New
Hampshire law); Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 App. Div. 2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1972) (pancreas like
a foreign object); Fonda v. Paulsen, 79 Misc. 2d 936, 940, 361 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485 (Sup. Ct.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 46 App. Div. 2d 540, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1975) (cancer Is
not a foreign object); Le Vine v. Isoserve, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct.
1972) (radioactive isotope is a foreign object).
Other states have a broader discovery rule, extending beyond foreign objects, but the definition
of "discovery" differs, depending on the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d
366, 368-70 (Ist Cir. 1976) (discovery occurred, not at onset of symptoms, but when cause of
convulsions learned) (applying Michigan law); Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir.
1976) (discovery occurred when claimant learned or should have learned of association between
complaint and doctor's act) (applying federal law); Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970 (5th
Cir. 1975) (discovery occurred when plaintiff told illness due to drug) (applying Texas law);
Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 924-25 (8th Cir. 1970) (discovery occured when
the disease fully manifested itself and not at discovery of earliest symptom) (applying Arkansas
law); Dauzat v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 336 So. 2d 540 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (discovery
occurred when plaintiff placed on notice of malpractice, before permanent effects were evident);
Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974) (discovery occurred when causal
connection learned).
The discovery issue has frequently, but not exclusively, arisen in medical malpractice suits.
Courts vary as to whether they will extend their jurisdictions' rule allowing discovery in medical
malpractice cases to the area of products liability. See, e.g., Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518
F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1975) (extension) (applying Texas law); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 F.
Supp. 1392, 1398-1401 (D.N.H. 1976), affid, 556 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1977) (extension) (applying
New Hampshire law); Le Vine v. Isoserve, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct.
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prior to viability, 24 and absence of a cause of action if the danger of DES can
be shown to have been unknowable at the time of manufacture .2
5
1972) (implicit extension). Even where a state has a discovery rule and applies it in products
liability, the application may not extend to all causes of action. See, e.g., Raymond v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392, 1403 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 628 (ist Cir. 1977) (in breach of
warranty, statute of limitations runs from tender of delivery) (applying New Hampshire law). For
further discussion of these statute of limitations problems, see generally AnnoL, 4 A.L.R.3d 821
(1965 & Supp. 1977); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950 & Later Case Serv. 1971 & Supp. 1977);
Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products Liability Cases, 13
Forum 279 (1977).
24. The first American case to consider a cause of action based on prenatal injury ruled that
such an action was not maintainable. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (Holmes, J.).
In part, the decision was based on the fact that the fetus was not viable. i.e., incapable of
independent life, at the time of injury. Id. at 16. Dietrich was followed in the United States until
a 1946 decision allowing an action for prenatal injury. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138
(D.D.C. 1946); see Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, § 2[a] (1971). The court in Bonbrest distinguished
its ruling from that of Dietrich because the injury it considered occurred when the child was
viable. 65 F. Supp. at 140. By 1972, all jurisdictions allowed a cause of action for prenatal
injuries when the child was born alive. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, § 3[c] (1971) (all states but
Alabama allowed cause of action for fetal injury); Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596
(1972) (allowing cause of action for fetal injury). A few courts have allowed causes of action for
fetal injury where the plaintiff was not yet conceived when the tortious conduct took place. E.g.,
Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973); Renslow v,
Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977); see 48 U. Colo. L. Rev. 621 (1977).
Despite the unanimity in allowing a cause of action for fetal injury, the distinction between an
injury occurring before or after viability has continued, with the states split on whether an action
may be maintained for an injury sustained prior to viability. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, § 3[a)-b]
(1971 & Supp. 1977) (listing jurisdictions on both sides of the question). The refusal to allow
recovery for an injury which occurred before viability is based partly on precedent and partly on
the notion that proof of causation is more difficult in such cases. Not only is this unsound, but
"there is substantial medical authority which indicates that congenital structural defects oc-
casioned by environmental factors can be sustained only within the earliest stages of the pretiable
period. Judicial disallowance of actions for injuries to nonviable fetuses may well be a denial of
the most meritorious claims." Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to
Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 554, 563 (1962) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
See generally Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 579 (1965).
It was recommended that DES be administered to pregnant women from early in their
pregnancies until they reached term. Smith, supra note 2, at 823-24. Some women, however,
appear to have been treated on a short-term basis, only at the time their pregnancies were
threatened. See Heinonen, Diethylstilbestrol in Pregnancy, 31 Cancer 573, 575 (1973). Generally,
this would be early in the pregnancy. See Smith supra. Thus, although it is probably true that all
DES injuries were sustained during the early months of pregnancy, M. Dixon, supra note 2,
§ 11.27, in those cases where the drug was only administered at that time, plaintiffs may be
unable to maintain a cause of action in some jurisdictions.
25. For the required standard of knowledge on the part of a manufacturer in a suit for drug
injury, see note 18 supra and accompanying text. Plaintiffs in the DES cases point to a substantial
body of scientific literature by 1947 connecting the use of hormones to carcinogenic effects. See,
e.g., Abel, Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 17, at 11, apps. 18-43 (listing 402 articles, 56 dealing
specifically with estrogens, published primarily in the 1940's). In addition, by 1947 oral adminis-
tration of DES to laboratory animals had produced cancer. Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177, 179
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
However, the unique legal problem in the DES cases concerns the crucial
issue of cause-in-fact. Because of the time lapse from the intake of DES to the
manifestation of injury, and the further interval before recognition of DES as
the probably causative agent,26 a majority of plaintiffs cannot identify the
manufacturer of the drug ingested by their mothers. 2 7 In such suits, 28
(7th Cir. 1966). Consequently, plaintiffs argue that when DES was first manufactured for use in
pregnancy, defendants should have known it was potentially carcinogenic. See, e.g., Abel,
Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 17, at 11-13. In particular, since studies of DES at that time showed a
"primary effect on the genito-urinary tract," manufacturers were on notice to conduct detailed
studies of such effects. M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 11.27.
A major question left unanswered by this argument, however, is whether defendants had a
duty in 1947 to test for injuries to the second generation. It was only after the thalidomide
disaster in the early 1960's that "generational testing" of drugs was instituted. Gellis, The Affects
of Drugs on the Unborn Child, in The Medicated Society 91, 94 (S. Proger ed. 1968). Since only
generational testing would have revealed the danger to the daughters of the women who took the
drug, and since defendants' duty under a negligence standard would extend only to those testing
methods which were known to experts at the time, defendants have a "state of the art" defense,
whereby they only become liable for the results of DES ingested after the early 1960's. See Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-90 15th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1968); Noel, Products Defective Because of
Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 266-67 (1969). See generally Raleigh, The
"State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old "Defense," 4 Ohio N.U.L. Rev.
249 (1977).
A plaintiff's attorney in the DES cases suggests that the Restatement exception for drugs in a
strict liability cause of action should not apply where the manufacturer knew, or should have
known, that his product was ineffective. This is because the exception is based on the fact that
the drug's benefit appears to outweigh its risk. See note 18 supra. If the manufacturer should
have known that his product had no benefit, he is not entitled to avail himself of the Restatement
exception. This results in the manufacturer's liability under strict liability, and probably war-
ranty, even if he did not know of his product's danger. Interview with Herbert Kolsby, In
Philadelphia (Aug. 17, 1977). Since studies in the early 1950's raised serious questions about the
efficacy of DES, see note 2 supra, this theory would result in much earlier liability for the DES
manufacturers. See also Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498. F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Keeton, Products Liability -- Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 Vand. L.
Rev. 131, 141-43 (1972).
26. See note 23 supra. The time lapse has resulted in the destruction of doctors' records of
DES prescriptions. M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 11.27.
27. In general, for any cause of action in products liability, it is required that the defendant
be identified as responsible for the product which caused injury. The named manufacturer must
actually have made the product in question. E.g., O'Donnell v. Geneva Metal Wheel Co., 183
F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 903. (1951); Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62
F.R.D. 22, 28 (D. Minn. 1973); Thompson-Hayward Chem Co. v. Childress, 277 Ala. 285, 289,
169 So. 2d 305, 309 (1964); McDonough v. General Motors Corp., 6 Mich. App. 239, 148
N.W.2d 911 (1967); Rockett v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 4.50 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970);
63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 5 (2d ed. 1972); Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344 (1973); 1 R. Hursh
& H. Bailey, American Law of Products Liability § 1:41 (2d ed. 1974). The requirement that
the manufacturer be identified is actually a specific instance of the general legal requirement that
the defendant be the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury. Therefore, it may be obviated under
certain circumstances. See notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text.
28. E.g., Rheingold v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 74 Civil 3420 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
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plaintiffs have joined as many as ninety-four DES manufacturers as defen-
dants, 29 alleging joint and several liability. According to the existing law of
joint tortfeasors, there are two possible theories which plaintiffs may utilize in
order to solve the cause-in-fact problems posed by the DES cases. Under the
first theory, plaintiff must prove that the defendants engaged in a concerted
action. 30 Thus, each manufacturer becomes a cause-in-fact of each plaintiff's
injury and the need to identify a particular manufacturer as defendant is
obviated. Joint and several liability results. The second theory is alternative
liability31 as exemplified by Summers v. Tice, 32 in which all the defendants
had behaved tortiously but only one had caused the plaintiff's injury. Under
this approach, joinder of all tortfeasors shifts the burden of proof on the issue
of causation from plaintiffs to defendants. Since defendants in the DES cases
are as unable as plaintiffs to identify a particular manufacturer as the one
who marketed the drug directly responsible for plaintiff's injury, this second
theory also effectively results in joint and several liability. It should be noted
that under either theory, the court must make a further determination of
proximate cause: does the defendants' duty to protect the plaintiff extend to
the particular result involved?33 As a matter of policy, a court may refuse to
hold defendants jointly liable where to do so would impose an extraordinary
extension of the "original obligation" 34 owed by defendants to the plaintiff.
Since neither concert nor alternative liability has ever been applied to a
14, 1975); Fields v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. C 122248 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec, 1977) (motions for
summary judgment granted with respect to most defendants); Rogers v. Abbott Labs., No. 61220
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1977) (case dismissed with respect to most defendants); Sindell v. Boyle Drug
Co., No. C 169127 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977) (case dismissed with respect to most defendants); Abel
v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 74-030-070 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 16, 1977) tdefendants' motion for
partial summary judgment granted); Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 3838176 (N.Y Sup.
Ct., filed Mar. 1976) (for change in caption, see note 13 supra); Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., No.
21234/76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed 1976); Krieger v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 21235176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
filed 1976); Stack v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, No. GD 77-05944 (Pa. Ct. C.P. June 30, 1977) (class
action stricken). In all suits listed above involving multiple defendants, where the courts have
considered motions by the defendants for dismissal or summary judgment based on the plaintiff's
inability to identify the injury producing drug, see note 27 supra, the lower courts have refused to
recognize a cause of action and plaintiffs are appealing, see Fields v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. C
122248 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 1977) (motions for summary judgment granted with respect to most
defendants); Rogers v. Abbott Labs., No. 61220 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977) (case dismissed with
respect to most defendants); Sindell v. Boyle Drug Co., No. C 169127 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977) (case
dismissed with respect to most defendants); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 74-030-070 NP (Mich.
Cir. Ct. May 16, 1977) (defendants' motion for partial summary judgment granted).
29. E.g., Wood v. Abbot Laboratories, No. 76-1312 (E.D. Pa., filed 1976); see note 3 supra.
Other suits with multiple defendants joined far fewer defendants. E.g., Rheingold v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 74 Civil 3420 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975) (15 corporate defendants);
Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons., Inc., No. 3838/76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Mar. 1976) (19 corporate
defendants as of Dec. 1977) (for change in caption, see note 13 supra).
30. See pt. M(A) infra.
31. See pt. 11(B) infra.
32. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), discussed at notes 120-127 infra and accompanying text.
33. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 42, at 244.
34. Id.
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factual pattern with the complex characteristics of the DES cases, this
Comment will examine the logic, policy, and practice of these theories as
they relate to DES. It will suggest that joint and several liability might be
found under either theory, but it will also propose and define a third theory,
that of "enterprise liability," 35 as the best solution to the causation problems
of DES.
Enterprise liability is a hybrid theory, with characteristics derived from
alternative liability and concert of action, although it is based primarily on the
first of these. In the process of fusion, both theories have been modified to
enable plaintiffs to plead and prove their case more easily, and also to protect
defendants. Under enterprise liability, the plaintiff must prove there is a high
probability that her injury was caused by the tortious behavior of some one of
the defendants-a modification of alternative liability. In addition, she must
show that defendants concertedly adhered to a dangerous, industrywide safety
standard in their manufacture of the injury-producing product. Evidence of
these two elements will shift the burden of proof on causation to the
defendants.
Enterprise liability would impose joint and several liability in a situation
which occurs with increasing frequency in our highly industrialized society.
Fungible products with delayed and dangerous effects cause injury, but the
instrumentality and agent producing the specific injury are unidentifiable.3 6
35. The term is derived from its usage in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F.
Supp. 353, 376-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The same term is being used loosely by attorneys in the DES
cases to denote any theory derived from Hall under which plaintiffs who cannot identify the
manufacturer of the injury-producing product may join all the manufacturers of DES. For a
discussion of the enterprise liability theory proposed in this Comment, see pt. IV htfra.
36. A large number of cases involving injuries caused by asbestos exposure have been filed.
E.g., Ferris v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 77-639 (E.D. Va., filed Oct. 13, 1977); see N.Y.
Times, Jan. 30, 1977, at 34, col. 1 (widow of sheet metal worker suing 17 asbestos companies).
Only a few have been litigated. E.g., Karjala v. Johns-Munville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th
Cir. 1975); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974). Many of these actions present the same identification problem posed by the
DES suits. Asbestos containing products are used in thermal insulation. The workmen in the
building trades exposed to such products may, after a long latency period, develop asbestosis,
mesothelioma, or lung cancer, all of which may be fatal. There are hundreds of distributors of
asbestos products, of which approximately 12 to 15 are the major manufacturers. Several
thousand plaintiffs have instituted hundreds of suits for injury from asbestos products in state
and federal courts nationwide, although predominantly on the east coast. Some of these are class
action suits. Since the employers or companies using asbestos products may obtain them from
more than one manufacturer, and workers may have moved from one job in the building trade to
another, the plaintiffs have frequently been multiply exposed and often have difficulty identifying
the manufacturers of the injury-producing products to which they were exposed. Consequently,
some of the asbestos suits initially joined as many as 45 defendants, although the number is now
being narrowed. Telephone interview with Gene Locks, attorney for a substantial number of
plaintiffs in asbestos cases (Feb. 7, 1978). It must be assumed that plaintiffs' theories of liability
will be similar to those proposed in the DES cases. See note 136 infra.
The inability to identify a source of injury has also been the subject of comment in connection
with suits for environmental pollution. See Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology
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Although the theory extends liability and is proposed at a time when insurers
are lobbying to decrease the responsibility of manufacturers to the con-
sumer, 37 it is suggested as an equitable, 'legally and economically sound
method of joint liability. The DES cases are proposed as the first instance for
its application.
I. THE DRUG INDUSTRY
In order to understand the factual, legal, and policy issues of the DES
cases, some understanding of the nature of the drug industry and its produc-
tion of DES is required. The drug industry is one of both high profits and
high returns. Between 1961 and 1971, it ranked either first or second annually
among the major industries in return on both stockholders' equity and sales. 38
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the industry's profits rose annually
by approximately 14%. This has recently dropped to 10%, which has been
acknowledged by an industry spokesman to be a satisfactory level.3 9 Seven-
teen drug companies, a number of them defendants in DES actions, appeared
on the 1976 Fortune 500 list of the largest industrial corporations in the
United States, ranked by sales.40 In a 1972 report to Congress, it was
emphasized that the drug industry was "practically unique" in that "[]osses,
or even low profits, are practically unheard of among large drug com-
panies.' 4 1 Although the pharmaceutical manufacturers justify their profits by
the extreme risk inherent in the development of new drugs,42 critics have
recognized an inherent contradiction in the coexistence of high risks and
Assessment, 38 U. Cin. L. Rev. 587, 616-20 (1969); Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung
Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 Brooklyn L. Rev. 17, 30-32 (1966). The
problem becomes most severe when the environmental agent is a carcinogen, because of the
approximately 15- to 40-year latency period for the development of cancer after exposure. See
Environmental Carcinogenesis, supra note 2, at 94-97, 107-12. The recent discovery that a
number of different pesticides are carcinogenic exemplifies a situation in which future lawsuits
could develop with the same problem as the DES suits. Since these pesticides have been in
widespread use, and since growers of agricultural products may use more than one pesticide, if
consumers of such products are affected, it will be impossible for them to identify the injury-
producing product. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1977, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1977, at
1, col. 2.
37. See Insurance Information Institute, The Product Liability Problem. Proposals for
Solutions Through Tort Reform (1977) (pamphlet available from the Institute, 110 William St..
N.Y., N.Y.). The Institute suggests legislative changes in the following areas, among others:
statutes of limitation, awards for "pain and suffering," punitive damages, and contingency fees.
38. Senate Subcomm. on Monopoly, Select Comm. on Small Business, Competitive Problems
in the Drug Industry, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report].
39. Bus. Week, Jan. 17, 1977, at 80.
40. Fortune, May 1977, at 364-91.
41. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 33 (quoting Dr. Mueller, then Chief Economist to the
Federal Trade Commission).
42. Id. at 32.
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consistently high, industrywide profits.4 3 Such risks would result in at least
"occasional losses" to some firms. 44
Parallel practices provide a basis for charges of concert in the drug
industry. Parallel practices are demonstrated in a unique feature of drug
companies, known as the "me-too" 45 practice. Once a manufacturer has
issued a drug, other companies may foresee a significant potential market for
this product and wish to manufacture the same drug. If they are unable to
do so without violating a patent and are also unable to obtain a licensing
arrangement, they often spend considerable research money to develop a drug
which varies only insignificantly from the original product. This can then be
marketed without invading the original patent. 46 The result is a proliferation
of trade names with one basic product.4 7 Furthermore, a single defect in the
original drug may be common to all similar products subsequently manufac-
tured, regardless of brand name. 48
This parallel pattern is evident in the manufacture of DES. Since DES was
unpatented by its inventor and potentially useful for the treatment of a variety
of estrogen problems in women, in 1941 twelve drug companies submitted a
joint clinical file to the FDA pursuant to their request for New Drug
Applications (N.D.A.'s) for DES. These twelve companies also agreed on
common chemical standards for the drug to be manufactured by each of
them, and on uniform labeling and product literature. The purposes for which
the drug was approved in 1941 did not include its subsequent use for the
prevention of miscarriages. 49 Commencing in 1947 and during a short period
of time thereafter, new individual N.D.A.'s for the use of DES by pregnant
women were submitted by these companies and others, and approved by the
FDA.5 ° Subsequently, other, generically differentiated drugs with the same
danger as DES if used during pregnancy were developed and manufactured
by still other drug companies to take advantage of the growing market. 5 1
Although the parties to the DES suits hotly dispute the significance of the
1941 joint file and agreement, especially since DES was not being submitted
to the FDA for use by pregnant women at that time, plaintiffs have cited
these events in charging defendants with concert of action. 52
Other special features of the drug industry deserve attention both because
43. Id. at 35.
44. Id.
45. M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 5.05110].
46. Id. § 6.03; Senate Report, supra note 38, at 5.
47. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 41-42.
48. M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 6.03.
49. Abel, Defendants' Brief, supra note 1, at 44-48; Abel, Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 17, at
2-4. Although the accounts by the two sides in Abel of the events in 1941 differ in some details,
and in the emphases placed on certain of these events, the basic occurrences are not disputed.
50. Abel, Defendants' Brief, supra note 1, at 4; Abel, Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 17, at 6.
51. Abel, Defendants' Brief, supra note 1, at 4; Abel, Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 17, at 9. A
list combining generic and brand names mentions 78 DES-type drugs. Questions, supra note 7, at
10-11.
52. E.g., Abel, Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 17, at 2-14.
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they aid in understanding the general background of the DES cases and
because they also create suspicions of concerted action among industry
members. Two such features are monopoly and pricing patterns. Despite the
several hundred manufacturers of DES and related drugs, it has been
estimated that Eli Lilly & Co. and five or six other manufacturers accounted
for 90% of the market for this drug. s 3 This situation is not unique to DES; the
pharmaceutical industry has been investigated by the Senate for its
monopolistic practices5 4 and has been the subject of major antitrust suits.s s
The drug industry consists of a series of product markets, each defined by a
group of competitive, or substitutable, drugs. High barriers to market entry
favor the large companies which can spend the most on promotion, and those
which have a patent or are first to develop and advertise a drug. Although
many firms may participate in a certain product market, a small number of
the same companies tend to dominate each market.s 6 It has been reported
that "[i]n a group of twenty such markets, the proportion of output accounted
for by the leading five firms ranged from 56 percent to 98 percent.'"s
Drugs produced by the dominant companies within a given market are
generally not price competitive with each other, and frequently cost many
times more than the competing brands of lesser known firms with a far
smaller share of the market.5 8 This is probably due to the lack of buyer
participation in the creation of demand for a given product. The doctor, not
the consumer, determines when a particular type of drug is required, and then
specifies in his prescription the brand to be purchased. s9 Since the primary
medical criteria for drug use are safety and efficacy rather than price, 60 and
since the major source of drug information is the manufacturers themselves
rather than objective sources, 61 industry members spend enormous amounts
53. B. Seaman, supra note 7, at 33. Lilly is estimated to have been the largest producer of
DES. Id.
54. See Senate Report, supra note 38.
55. The antibiotics class actions have been the largest and lengthiest of such suits. These
began with a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation in 1951, and proceeded through the
Kefauver Committee investigation, FTC findings of patent fraud, criminal proceedings resulting
in eventual acquittal, and finally civil class actions. Charges at various times, in addition to
patent fraud, included price fixing and monopoly. Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class Actions, 1976
Am. B. Foundation Research J. 253 (history of cases through 1975).
56. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 27-30.
57. Id. at 30.
58. Id. at 11-23.
59. Id. at 3. However, the extent to which doctors affect the market for a particular brand
may be lessened as laws are passed allowing doctors to prescribe generically, and pharmacists to
substitute generically equivalent drugs for those prescribed by brand. See N.Y. Times, June 9,
1977, at 30, col. 1 (editorial urging passage of New York state legislation requiring generic
prescriptions). By 1977, over 25 states had repealed laws requiring prescription by brand name.
Id.
60. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 3.
61. The manufacturers supply drug information primarily through advertisements in medical
journals and the use of "detail men," who personally contact doctors to promote the use of specific
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of money in order to influence the doctor's choice of a drug. 62 The result is
wide variations in the prices of the same drug produced by different manufac-
turers, and very little relationship between cost and price.63 The fact that the
dominant drug in a product market may also be the one with the highest price
raises questions of concert. The defensive reaction of many members of the
drug industry when asked to explain this phenomenon to government inves-
tigators does nothing to alleviate this suspicion. 64 Although price is not a
major factor in a doctor's choice of a drug, one would expect it to carry some
weight where all other factors are equal. Nevertheless, those manufacturers
who make a cheaper equivalent product do not generally alert doctors to this
fact. 6S It seems entirely possible that this indicates an exchange of favors by
major members of the drug industry, allowing each to continue to dominate
certain product markets without interference.
Another indication of cooperation within the drug industry is its well-
financed trade association, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association
(PMA). It has been a strong lobbyist with legislative groups, the American
Medical Association, and the FDA'.66 An organization which appears to have
been a predecessor of the PMA, The American Drug Manufacturers Associa-
tion, was instrumental in arranging the 1941 joint clinical submission for DES
to the FDA. 6
7
III. CONCERT OF ACTION AND ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY
A. Concert
Concert of action is one of the two theories under which plaintiffs may be
able to obtain joint and several liability in the DES suits. 68 The typical
drugs. Id. at 54-59. Even the Physicians' Desk Reference, widely relied on by doctors when
prescribing drugs, is subsidized by the firms that buy advertising space in it. Id. at 56.
62. In the early 1970's, the drug industry reported spending one billion dollars per year on
advertising. It used 20,000 detail men, whose salaries totalled 700 million dollars. Its average
expenditure for each physician in the United States was $5000. M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 6.1012).
.63. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 22-23.
64. Id. at 11-15.
65. Id. at 3-4. The Senate Committee, in its analysis of the information supplied to doctors,
concluded that "[p]hysicians need comparative drug and drug product information, including
relative price data, if they are to function as fully informed prescription drug purchasing agents
for their patients. The evidence indicates that, at present, they do not receive this information in
a useable form." Id. at 58.
66. M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 6.01. The PMA and FDA have been criticized for the apparent
strength of their relationship, including the number of FDA personnel who have been employed
by the industry before or after their FDA tenure. Id.
67. See Abel, Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 17, at 2-3, apps. 2-4.
68. There are generally considered to be four situations in tort law in which joint and several
liability is imposed. Only one of these, concert, is directly applicable to the DES cases. The
second, vicarious liability, includes master-servant and principal-agent relationships and is clearly
irrelevant. The third encompasses instances in which the defendants are under a common duty to
the plaintiff. E.g., Corcoran v. Banner Super Mkt., Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 425, 227 N.E.2d 304, 280
N.Y.S.2d 385 (1967), modified on other grounds, 21 N.Y.2d 793, 235 N.E.2d 455, 288 N.Y.S.2d
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concert of action case is that of the illegal drag race in which a bystander is
injured by one of the participants. Assume A, B, and C participate in such a
race and P, a bystander, is injured by A's car. P may sue A or B or C or any
combination thereof, and each of the three is jointly and severally liable for
P's injury. P need only allege that each defendant he has joined helped plan
and facilitate the race, that the participation of each was tortious, and that his
injury resulted from the race. 69 A plan or unspoken agreement may be inferred
from the parallel actions of A, B, and C.
70
Although the legal theory of concert seems to have evolved in order to deter
hazardous group behavior rather than because the actual injury-producing
party could not be identified, 7' the theory must deal with the problem of
causation. Where A, according to commonsense notions of causation, was the
only cause-in-fact of P's injury, some justification must be found for also
holding B and C as causative agents. It has been suggested that "the act of
one is the act of all, ' 7 2 that is, that B and C are vicariously liable for A's act.7
3
Another view theorizes that the causative tortious event was the car race itself
in which all three parties participated, rather than A's collision with P. 7 4 Both
484 (1968) (joint and several liability applied to each of the two building owners for falling board
affixed to both buildings). These cases presuppose one duty shared by the defendants and thus a
closer bond among defendants than exists in the DES cases.
The fourth situation is where the concurring acts of independently acting tortfeasors unite to
produce an indivisible injury. Although, at first glance, this theory appears to apply to the DES
cases, see notes 135-41 infra and accompanying text, this is not the case since the tortfeasors' acts
concurred at the point of producing and marketing DES and not at the point of injury. But cf
Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (in case similar
to DES, this difference is noted but apparently presented no difficulty). Only to the extent that
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), see pt. III(B) infra, is considered a special
instance of these indivisible injury cases, can this fourth theory of joint and several liability be
directly applied to the DES cases. See 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 10.1, at
702-04 (1956). For discussion of these four forms of joint and several liability, see generally id.
§ 10.1; W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 52, at 314-17.
69. See 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 68, § 10.1, at 698-99; W. Prosser. supra note 18.
§ 46; Restatement of Torts § 876 (1939). The minimal requirements for participation in concerted
wrongdoing have been stated as follows: "All those who, in pursuance of a common plan or
design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or
who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their
benefit, are equally liable with him." W. Prosser, supra § 46, at 292 (footnotes omitted).
70. E.g., Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968) (inference from cars racing
side by side at twice the legal speed); Skroh v. Newby, 237 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970) (inference from cars staying together at 90 m.p.h.); see W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 46, at
292.
71. In none of the cases applying concert to find liability, with the exception of Hall v. El.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), and the hunters cases cited in
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 84, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (1948), did identification present any problem.
72. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 46, at 291 (quoting Sir John Heydon's Case, I I Co. Rep. 5,
77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613)).
73. Id.
74. "The primary negligence involved is the race itself." Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C. 725,
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explanations of cause-in-fact seem to be based on a fiction. Vicarious liability
is necessarily a fiction. Under the second view, whenever there are more than
two participants in the concerted action, the "but for" definition of cause-in-
fact7 5 is fictional as to the liability of some of the participants for the
concerted action. For example, if C had nQt participated in the race at all, A
and B might still have raced and injured P. Thus it is not true that, "but for"
C's action, P would not have been hurt. However, this second justification
for finding that each party to a concerted action is a cause-in-fact of the result
seems clearly defensible when based on Prosser's preferred definition of
cause-in-fact as "a material element and a substantial factor" in plaintiff's
injury. 76 Under this rationale, the fiction is eliminated since each of the three
participants contributed materially to the occurrence of the race, although it
might have taken place even if one were absent.
An obvious analogy exists between the drag race and the manufacture of
DES. Arguably, the drug industry pattern, where the first manufacturers of a
product achieve dominance, could have motivated the decision of the original
manufacturers to pool their data and rush into production without adequate
testing. If they knew, or should have known, that this created the risk of an
unreasonably dangerous product, their original cooperative behavior was
tortious. 77 It can be argued that the later FDA approval of DES for use in
pregnancy depended on this earlier joint submission of clinical data. Parallel,
imitative practices among many of the manufacturers of DES, as well as
actual agreement in some cases, resulted in uniform cautions, lists of con-
traindications and dosage schedules, and reliance on the same dubious
scientific articles in promotional materials. The "me-too" practice in the drug
industry increased the manufacture of DES and the consequent wide publicity
and use of this drug. 78 Thus each individual plaintiff's injuries resulted from
the tortious, concerted activities of all DES manufacturers, just as P's injury
resulted from the drag race in which A, B, and C participated. Since each
DES manufacturer is a "substantial factor" causing each plaintiff's injuries,
he is jointly and severally liable regardless of whether he manufactured the
particular drug which the plaintiff's mother ingested.
Questions arise in the application of concert of action to the DES cases.
One is whether concert, generally used in cases where individual tortfeasors
participate in car races or assaults, 79 can be extended beyond a simple tort
731, 118 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1961); cf. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353,
372 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (emphasizing "joint control of risk').
75. "[Tlhe 'but for' or 'sine qua non' rule ...may be stated as follows: The defendant's
conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it." W. Prosser,
supra note 18, § 41, at 238-39 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 240; cf. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev.
543, 548-61 (1962) (test of cause-in-fact is whether defendant's conduct contributed to victim's
injury). This proposition has been judicially accepted. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 41, at 240 &
nn. 26, 27.
77. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
79. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see 6
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situation to one as complex as cooperation among modern industrial organiza-
tions. Given sufficient evidence of cooperation, concert should be as applica-
ble to corporate activities as to individual activity. Courts have shown a
willingness to apply it in such situations.
Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nernours & Co.80 is the major case involving
corporate defendants where concert has been applied. One of the two cases
consolidated in Halls ' involved twelve separate accidents in which thirteen
children were injured by dynamite blasting caps. 82 The evidence of individual
manufacture was destroyed by the explosions. 83 Plaintiffs joined the six major
domestic manufacturers of blasting caps and the industry's trade association,
alleging that all the defendants knew that blasting caps were dangerous and
agreed not to place warnings on them.8 4 The court held that defendants were
not entitled to a dismissal for plaintiffs' failure to state a claim since plaintiffs
were pleading concert of action. 8s Thus, plaintiffs were not required to allege
either a conspiracy to commit intentional harm or a joint venture.8 6 Hall is
parallel to the DES cases not only because the defendants were corporate
entities comprising virtually an entire industry,87 but also because concert was
used not to deter manufacturers of blasting caps but exclusively to cure
plaintiff's inability to identify the particular defendant whose product caused
the injury. The court's awareness of its unusual use of concert was demon-
strated by its additional requirement that the burden of proof of causation be
shifted to defendants. 88 Ordinarily plaintiff's showing that each defendant
joined in the concerted action would be sufficient to show that each was a
cause and since proof of causation would be satisfied, there would be no need
to shift this burden to defendants. 89 The court's purpose in allowing the use of
the concert theory becomes even clearer in light of the other case90 consoli-
dated in Hall. In that case, plaintiffs were able to identify the manufacturers of
the injury-producing caps. Thus, the court refused to allow a plea of concert
Am. Jur. 2d Assault and Battery §§ 12 7-30 (1963 & Supp. 1977) (collecting assault cases in which'
joint liability imposed); Annot., 13 A.L.Rt3d 431 (1967 & Supp. 1977) (collecting car racing cases
in which joint liability imposed on participants not directly responsible for injury).
80. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
81. Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
82. Id. at 359.
83. Id. at 378.
84. Id. at 359.
85. Id. at 386.
86. Id. at 372-74. While the term "conspiracy" is sometimes used in concert cases, it is
unnecessary and inaccurate since conspiracy or agreement alone is insufficient for a tort. For
concert, there must be an understanding among the defendants, and a tortious act by one of
them. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 47, at 293; see F. Harper & F. James, supra note 68, § 10.1,
at 699. The other participants must be more than mere spectators. W. Prosser, supra § 47, at 292.
For the minimal requirements for participants, see note 69 supra.
87. 345 F. Supp. at 358.
88. Id. at 378-80. For a further discussion of Hall's combination of concert and a shift in the
burden of proof of causation, see notes 197-202 infra and accompanying test.
89. See W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 46.
90. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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and the joinder as defendants of those manufacturers whose products had not
injured each of the plaintiffs. 9
A group of California cases 92 are noteworthy for extending liability to
corporate defendants who, although not previously considered causes-in-fact
of injury, were found liable because of the degree of their cooperation with
the traditionally liable party. In each of these cases, while the court did not
explicitly refer to concert, the language of the opinion indicated that the
corporation's liability was based on a theory of concert of action. In Connor v.
Great Western Savings & Loan Association,93 liability was extended to a
bank-lender where the loan recipient negligently designed and constructed
homes. A joint venture was not found because the bank and the builder did
not share profits and losses. However, the bank had a right to approve
building plans, received first rights on construction loans to home buyers, and
knew that the developer was dangerously underfinanced. It thus had a duty to
the buyers although it was not in privity of contract with them. 94 The bank
was found liable because "Great Western became much more than a lender
It became an active participant in a home construction enterprise. 95
In Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 96 the endorser of a defective product was held
liable in negligence, although it had nothing to do with the product's
manufacture. Good Housekeeping, by giving the product its seal of approval,
had "voluntarily involved itself into the marketing process, having in effect
loaned its reputation to promote and induce the sale of a given product
. ", " In the third of these cases, Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 98 a trade-
mark licensor was held strictly liable in tort for a defective shotgun shell actu-
ally manufactured by a Mexican affiliate. Although Remington was not the
majority owner of the Mexican company's stock, Remington had a right of
inspection and quality control of the product, its trademark and name were
used on the package, and it received royalty payments and a percentage of
net sales. 99 The court found controlling "defendant's participatory connection,
for his personal profit or other benefit, with the injury-producing product and
with the enterprise that created consumer demand for and reliance upon the
product . .. ."100
91. Id. at 382-84. "A 'novel or boundary line' principle .... particularly where it requires
courts and litigants to assume heavy burdens, need not be extended to situations where
traditional remedies are perfectly satisfactory." Id. at 383 (source of quotation omitted).
92. Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1968); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972);
Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
93. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968), discussed in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 373 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
94. Id. at 860-66, 447 P.2d at 613-17, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373-77.
95. Id. at 864, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at .76.
96. 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
97. Id. at 684, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
98. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
99. Id. at 717-19, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
100. Id. at 725, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
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Another problem in the application of concert to the DES cases is eviden-
tiary: what is sufficient evidence of concert absent explicit agreement? While
discovery in the DES cases is not complete, the principal evidence of explicit
agreement thus far is that of the twelve original manufacturers who jointly
submitted clinical data to the FDA in 1941. With respect to subsequent
activity and manufacturers other than these twelve, evidence consists of
parallel activity and the cooperative nature of the industry. While concert
does not require conspiracy or even an inferred agreement, but only an
unspoken "tacit understanding,"' 0' it is easier to infer such an understanding
between two cars racing side-by-side at ninety miles an hour'0 2 than among a
number of drug manufacturers behaving in similar fashion. Nevertheless,
courts should be willing to allow such an inference where the parallel
behavior is knowing, part of a generally cooperative pattern in the industry,
and beneficial to the participants, when accompanied by minimal evidence of
explicit agreement.10 3 Relevant here are antitrust cases based on section I of
the Sherman Act, which requires a "contract, combination . . . or conspir-
acy."'' 4 The Supreme Court has held that in a section 1 case consciously
parallel behavior without express agreement is sufficient evidence for a jury
determination of conspiracy, 10 5 although such a determination is not com-
pelled.10 6 Generally, lower courts have required some additional evidence of
interdependence, beyond that of mere parallelism, to find conspiracy.' 0 7 Such
evidence in the DES cases would be the original agreement. The antitrust
cases have been cited as precedent in tort cases finding concert on the basis of
parallel activity among business enterprises, including competitors, even
where there was little additional evidence of contact among the defendants.' 0 8
101. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 46, at 292.
102. See note 70 supra.
103. See Roberto Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein S., M.B.H., 31 F. Supp. 76
(S.D.N.Y. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 116 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Compania
Espanola de Navegadon Maritima, S.A. v. Roberto Hernandez, Inc., 313 U.S. 582 (1941)
(concerted action found among three shipping lines refusing space to plaintiff's products, where
evidence was of parallel behavior, benefit to defendant, industry cooperation, and statement by
one defendant and one telegram from trade association); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Jones, 245 Ark.
179, 431 S.W.2d 728 (1968) (insurance company liable for fraud although actual misrepresenta-
tion made by claims service, where cooperation was assumed from benefit to insurance company
and one telephone call between them).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
105. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939).
106. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.. 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
107. See ABA, Antitrust Law Developments 36-37 (1975).
108. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. Lehman Bros. v,
Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), on remand sub nom. Schein v. Chasen. 519 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1975);
Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Schein was a
shareholders' derivative suit where the defendants were a stock-brokerage firm and mutual fund
companies, as well as individuals connected with these firms, to whom confidential information
had been leaked, with the result that shares were sold just before their prices fell. The Second
Circuit originally found all the defendants liable because, although no explicit agreement existed
among them, the sequence of events showed a "common enterprise." 478 F.2d at 822. Florida law
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Another possible approach to insufficient evidence of an explicit agreement is
suggested in dicta by the court in Hall. There it was indicated that parallel
behavior among competitors might be viewed as a lesser form of concert
sufficient to shift the burden of proof on the issue of causation to defen-
dants.10 9 Under one of these approaches, it is arguable that the minimal
evidence of agreement in DES.manufacturing history plus parallel activity is
sufficient to have the DES cases submitted to a jury.
Another problem is that, unlike the DES cases, most instances of concert
involve few defendants and the causative action occurs at the same time and
place.1 0 However, these characteristics do not appear necessary to the legal
theory of concert and have probably occurred coincidentally, because of the
simple nature of the tortious activities in most such cases. Nor have they
invariably appeared. An assault suit in which concert was found involved the
participation of seventy-five to eighty men."' In Hall, the activities of
defendants took place over a decade," 2 on a nationwide basis. 113A final problem in the application of concert to the DES cases is that,
where plaintiffs join fewer defendants than the total number of DES man-
ufacturers, they are subject to the charge of arbitrary and inequitable selec-
tion of responsible parties. Plaintiffs may prefer to join fewer than all DES
manufacturers, because of cost or general impracticability. In most cases they
will be forced to join fewer than all manufacturers. Some manufacturers may
not be subject to the court's jurisdiction; some may have gone out of
business; 14 and the plaintiffs will be forced to omit others because they
cannot ascertain who all the DES manufacturers were."1 5 There are three
responses to the charge of inequitable selection of defendants. First, the
defendants themselves can implead further manufacturers. Second, under the
theory of concert each participant is equally liable for the total damages and
governed, but since that law was unclear, the court reached its decision by applying and
extending New York precedent. Id. at 821. Subsequently, the Supreme Court vacated this
decision so that the Second Circuit could decide if the legad questions should be certified to the
Florida court. 416 U.S. at 391-92. Florida held it would not decide the issue as the Second Circuit
had. Hence, on remand, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision which it had
originally reversed. 519 F.2d at 454. Consequently, the original Second Circuit decision is only
demonstrative of what this circuit would hold if it were to decide a similar case under New York
law.
109. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
110. This is true in the majority of the car race and assault cases. See note 79 supra.
111. Meints v. Huntington, 276 F. 245, 247 (8th Cir. 1921).
112. 345 F. Supp. at 358.
113. Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439, 441-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
In this further disposition of the case, Judge Weinstein severed the various actions comprised in
it. See note 194 infra.
114. Some of the original manufacturers are defunct, some have merged with other com-
panies, and some have reorganized and now have other names. Liability of the parent company is
not completely clear in some cases of merger or subsequent acquisition. Interview with Henry
Simon, counsel in some of the DES litigation for one of the defendant drug companies, in New
York City (May 26, 1977).
115. See note 3 supra.
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
joinder of all possible tortfeasors is not therefore required. 116 Third, if, as
appears likely, only six or seven DES manufacturers dominated the mar-
ket, 11 7 joinder of only these manufacturers is a selection of the most responsi-
ble parties. Not only is one of them most likely to be the manufacturer of the
specific drug ingested, but the major manufacturers as a group were the pace
setters and decision makers in the manufacture of the drug.
It seems clear that concert could be pleaded in the DES cases in order to
arrive at joint and several liability. The most serious problem for plaintiffs,
and one which might lead to a directed verdict for defendants, is the possibly
inadequate evidence of agreement, or "tacit understanding," among defen-
dants.
B. Alternative Liability
"[D]ouble fault and alternative liability" is a completely different legal
theory which, like concert of action, imposes joint and several liability."18
This theory has been applied to cases where all defendants are at fault in that
all behaved tortiously, but only one unidentifiable defendant caused plaintiff's
injury. Since the defendants acted independently, there is no concert of
action. In order to solve the problem of causation, once all tortfeasors are
joined the courts have shifted the burden of proof of cause-in-fact to defen-
dants. Where defendants cannot meet this burden and absolve themselves,
joint and several liability results. 1 9 This theory is appropriate to the DES
cases for two reasons. Unlike concert, where the chief purpose of joint
liability is deterrence, this theory evolved in order to relieve a plaintiff of the
burden of proving causation where it was inequitable to require him to do so.
Secondly, the DES plaintiff is relieved of the evidentiary burden required by
concert of showing agreement or "tacit understanding."
Summers v. Tice 2 ° demonstrates the classic fact pattern of cases relying on
a theory of alternative liability. Here, plaintiff's two hunting companions
fired their guns simultaneously and negligently in his direction. Only one of
them could have fired the shot which injured him, but it was impossible for
plaintiff to ascertain which of them had done so. Although concert had been
found in similar cases cited as precedent,' 2 1 the court felt a holding of concert
was "straining that concept."'1 22 Instead, it justified its holding of joint and
several liability, unless either or both defendants could absolve themselves, on
policy grounds: where defendants are all wrongdoers and their negligence has
caused a situation in which the innocent plaintiff cannot identify the cause of
his injury, fairness dictates that he should not be required to do so or go
remediless. 123 In addition, the court pointed out, defendants often have better
116. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 52, at 314-15.
117. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
118. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 41, at 243.
119. F. Harper & F. James, supra note 68, § 10.1, at 703-04; W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 41,
at 243.
120. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
121. Id. at 84, 199 P.2d at 3.
122. Id. at 85, 199 P.2d at 3.
123. Id. at 86-87, 199 P.2d at 4-5.
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access to evidence of causation than do plaintiffs. 12 4 Therefore, "[tihe
wrongdoers should be left to work out between themselves any apportionment
[of damages]."' 25 The Restatement (Second) of Torts has codified the Sum-
mers holding in section 433B(3),' 26 offering the same policy reason of fair-
ness. 1
2 7
Analyzed in terms of cause-in-fact, Summers and the cases following it 128
create a clearly fictional presumption. If all wrongdoers are joined as de-
fendants, one of them must have been the cause-in-fact of injury. By shifting
the burden of proof to them, with the resulting possibility that each will be
found liable, the presumption has been created that each is the cause-in-
fact,' 29 although this is obviously impossible under any definition of causa-
tion. Since there is an equal probability of causation by each defendant, even
with the smallest possible number of defendants the probability for each is no
greater than 50%. However, the presumption can be justified because, since
all possible tortfeasors are joined, there is a 100% probability of causation
collectively. Since policy reasons favor finding liability, 30 the usual require-
ment in civil cases of a "preponderance of evidence"' 13 1 for each defen-
dant, here interpreted to mean a mathematical probability, 132 has been lifted
in favor of certainty as to all defendants.
124. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
125. Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
126. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(3) (1965) (Illustration 9 is Summers).
127. Id., Comment f.
128. E.g., Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hall v. E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see cases collected In
Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 98 (1949 & Later Case Serv. 1971 & Supp. 1977). It is apparent that only a
minority of jurisdictions have followed Summers. See id. A number of courts have recognized the
Summers' holding but have distinguished the case they were considering because all tortfeasors
were not before the court and/or had not all been proved negligent. See, e.g., Shunk v. Bosworth,
334 F.2d 309, 312 (6th Cir. 1964); Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22, 30 (D. Minn. 1973);
Eley v. Curzon, 121 Cal. App. 2d 280, 284-85, 263 P.2d 86, 89 (1953). Other cases, however,
have extended Summers to the situation where all defendants have not been proved tortfeasors.
Although citing Summers as precedent, these cases, in fact, apply a theory analogous to that of
Summers, using res ipsa loquitur. See notes 142-57 infra and accompanying text. Such cases will
be cited in this Comment as examples of the Summers line of cases.
129. True presumptions have been defined as compelling, at the least, a shift of the burden of
going forward with the evidence. C. McCormick, Evidence § 342, at 803 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
This rule is followed in most jurisdictions, but it has been proposed that presumptions should
allocate the burden of persuasion, or of proof, to the party denying the presumed fact. Id. § 345.
This is the effect given the Summers presumption. 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4; Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 433B(3) (1965).
130. See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
131. C. McCormick, supra note 129, § 339, at 793; 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed.
1940).
132. Courts are divided on the issue of whether the preponderance of the evidence standard is
based on a showing of probability or a subjective standard of belief. It has been suggested that
much of this dispute is a quibble over semantics. C. McCormick, supra note 129, § 339, at 795.
Many commentators believe the standard is one of probability, however it is described, and juries
should be so instructed. See id.; I E. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 24 (1954); Broun &
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Many of the elements of the Summers fact pattern are present in the DES
cases. Defendants' manufacture of dangerous pills for the unwary public can
be compared to the hunters shooting in the direction of their companion. In
each situation, all defendants are tortfeasors owing a duty of care to the
injured plaintiff. 133 In both the DES cases and Summers, the tortious nature
of each of the defendants' conduct was identical and created the same type of
risk.1 34 Neither the plaintiff in Summers hit by a bullet nor the DES daughter
who developed cancer is at fault for being unable to identify the one who
caused his injury. In both cases the defendants created the conditions which
caused the plaintiffs inability to identify-by shooting simultaneously in
Summers and by manufacturing a single drug under a variety of trade names
in the DES cases.
Although the Summers line of cases is the clearest example, arguably two
other groups of cases also exemplify alternative liability and should also be
compared to the DES cases. In these two groups of cases the burden of going
forward with the evidence or of proof as to causation is also shifted to
defendants because the plaintiff cannot identify the cause of his injury. In one
.group, the defendants' independent tortious actions have combined to cause
indivisible injury to the plaintiff.' 3 The multiple car collision cases are
examples of this group.' 36 Each of the defendants in such a collision has
Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. Ill. L.F. 23, 26-27; ef
McBaine, Burden of Proof. Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 242 (1944) Oury should be
convinced of required degree of probability). A distinct and highly technical controversy has
involved the use of probability theory in the courtroom to identify the defendant as the
wrongdoer. For example, where plaintiff was injured by a blue bus and defendant owns
four-fifths of the blue buses on that route, is this sufficient evidence to make the defendant liable?
See discussion and articles cited in J. Maguire, J. Weinstein, J. Chadbourn & J. Mansfield, Cases
and Materials on Evidence 871, n.1 (6th ed. 1973). This issue is distinguishable from the use of
probability in Summers and that advocated for the DES cases in this Comment because in
Summers and the DES cases probability is not being used to identify the defendants but to
apportion damages among them. It is submitted that this is a reasonable application of
probability and statistical evidence since in Summers and the DES cases all defendants are
tortfeasors, whereas in the case of the blue bus owner, the defendant may be totally innocent. See
notes 179-81, 208-11 infra and accompanying text for discussion of apportionment in the DES
cases.
133. Note that in Summers, however, defendants breached a duty of care to that particular
plaintiff. In the DES cases, defendants breached a duty to the class of which plaintiff is a
member. For a discussion of this as merely an enlargement of modern concepts dispensing with
privity, see pt. IV(B) infra.
134. The Restatement states that these are characteristics of the Summers fact pattern.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B, Comment h (1965).
135. 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 62 (1974); 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 68, § 10.1, at
701-09; W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 52, at 315-17.
136. See cases collected in Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 16 (1965 & Later Case Serv. 1976 & Supp.
1977). See also, for application of this theory to a case where the defendants caused cancer, Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094-96 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974). In Borel, the plaintiff was exposed to the asbestosis-producing products of each of the
defendants successively over a period of 33 years. Since it could not be determined which
exposure caused his injury, and since it had been proven that the effects of successive exposures
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theoretically caused some part of the damage, but the contribution of each is
difficult or impossible to apportion. Joint liability is generally found, 137 and
under the Restatement 138 and the law of some jurisdictions,1 39 the burden of
proof is shifted to defendants to limit their liability. The cases justify this joint
liability by saying that since all defendants contributed to the plaintiff's
injury, he should not be required to go remediless unless he can show the
degree to which each defendant contributed and identify the specific injury
each caused. 140 Arguably, many of these cases are examples of alternative
liability in another guise. For example, one car in a multiple collision might
have caused no injury to the plaintiff at all, 141 but if each defendant argued
this and the plaintiff were required to prove each one had caused some injury,
then all defendants could escape liability. Since this would be inequitable, the
courts shift the burden of proof just as they do in Summers.
The second group of cases are instances of joint liability in a res ipsa
loquitur context. Generally, res ipsa loquitur is used to infer negligence where
a single defendant is in exclusive control of the instrumentality causing
harm.1 42 However, even where there are multiple, independent defendants
and only one can be assumed to have caused the plaintiff's injury but he
cannot be identified, some courts have used res ipsa loquitur to infer negli-
gence and causation. Other courts have shifted the burden of going forward
with the evidence and even of proof as to negligence and causation to all the
defendants, with a finding of joint liability where the defendants cannot meet
this burden.14 3 In such cases there is obviously no proof of exclusive control.
were cumulative, each defendant was found a cause-in-fact of some of the injury. Id. at 1094.
The defendants were held jointly and severally liable, and the burden was shifted to defendants,
if they wished to limit their liability, to show what part of the damage each had caused. Id. at
1095. The court expressly refused to limit this rule to situations where the defendants' conduct
was simultaneous. Id. at 1095-96.
137. The theories under which liability is found vary. Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 16, § 2 (1965).
Only some jurisdictions offer the justification of concurrent causation and indivisible injury. Id.
§ 9[a].
138. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(2) (1965). This rule is applicable not only to
collision cases but to all cases where defendants' actions have combined to cause injury.
139. See, e.g., Lareau v. Southern Pac. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 789-92, 118 Cal. Rptr.
837, 840-42 (1975); Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, Inc., 330 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1959); Fugere v.
Pierce, 5 Wash. App. 592, 597-99, 490 P.2d 132, 135-36 (1971); Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 16, § 9[al
(1965) (collecting collision cases where burden of proof shifted).
140. "The 'single injury' rule is based on the proposition that it is more desirable, as a matter
of policy, for an injured and innocent plaintiff to recover his entire damages jointly and severally
from independent tortfeasors, one of whom may have to pay more than his just share, than It Is to
let two or more wrongdoers escape liability altogether, simply because the plaintiff cannot carry
the impossible burden of proving the respective shares of causation or because the tortfeasors
have not committed a joint tort." Holtz v. Holder, 101 Ariz. 247, 251, 418 P.2d 584, 588 (1966)
(en banc); cf. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948) (similar language).
141. See Cummings v. Kendall, 41 Cal. App. 2d 549, 107 P.2d 282 (1940) (defendants In
multiple car collision contend there is no evidence that they caused any of the damage); Annot.,
100 A.L.R.2d 16, 26 (1965).
142. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 39, at 219-20.
143. See generally id. at 221-24; McCoid, Negligence Actions Against Multiple Defendants, 7
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These cases go much further than Summers, or than would a DES case, in
that not all the defendants are tortfeasors. 14 4
One such case is Ybarra v. Spangard, 145 where the plaintiff awoke after an
appendectomy with an inexplicable paralysis of his shoulder. Knowing neither
the person nor the instrumentality which caused his injury, he sued six
persons, doctors and nurses, each of whom had an independent responsibility
for his welfare at some point during the period in which he was unconscious.
Presumably only one defendant was negligent. While the theory of concert of
action has been used, 146 with some plausibility, to explain the court's shifting
to the defendants of the burden of going forward with the evidence for
Stan. L. Rev. 480, 482-501 (1955); Comment, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Suits
Against Multiple Defendants, 34 Albany L. Rev. 106 (1969). The commentators state that res ipsa
loquitur is generally applied to multiple defendants where some form of joint liability, such as
concerted action, already exists among the defendants. Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 905, § I (1954); W.
Prosser, supra note 18, § 39, at 221. In such a situation, all defendants would automatically be
causes-in-fact of the injury. The cases themselves often seem to be stretching to apply this
concept. See, e.g., Dement v. Olin-lathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1960)
(defect causing injury was in either dynamite or cap, but held res ipsa loquitur applies to both
manufacturers because components made to be used in combination); Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. Zd
654, 226 P.2d 574 (1951) (master-servant relationship between two defendants, but each held
liable for the other's acts). Other cases clearly apply res ipsa loquitur to multiple defendants
acting independently, where only one defendant could be the cause-in-fact. See, e g., Litzmann
v. Humboldt County, 273 P.2d 82 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (only one of two independent
contractors supplied fair with fireworks which injured plaintiff); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613,
258 P.2d 317 (1953) (manufacturer, distributor, and retailer responsible for exploding bottle);
Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953) (bottler and retailer responsible for exploding
bottle). Many cases have elements of joint control and independent action, but independent
action predominates. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); notes
145-51 infra and accompanying text.
It is frequently impossible to determine the effect res ipsa loquitur is given in these cases. For
an analysis of this problem in Ybarra, for example, see note 147 infra. In most jurisdictions, res
ipsa loquitur is a form of circumstantial evidence from which the jury may, but need not, draw
an inference of negligence, which the defendants are not required to meet. W. Prosser, supra note
18, § 40, at 228-29. In California, where res ipsa loquitur is frequently applied to multiple
defendants, it is settled that res ipsa loquitor creates a mandatory inference, resulting in a
directed verdict for the plaintiff unless the defendant offers sufficient evidence to meet the
inference. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 691, 268 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1954); see
McCoid, supra at 484-85. The mandatory inference is thus a presumption, shifting the burden of
going forward with the evidence to the defendants. See note 129 supra. In several states, the
application of res ipsa loquitur shifts the burden of proof. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 40, at 230.
New Jersey has gone even further. See note 156 infra and accompanying text.
144. Consequently, the application of res ipsa loquitur to multiple defendants has been
severely criticized for imposing liability without fault. Many of the criticisms have been directed
at Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), but are equally applicable to similar
cases. See Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 662-65, 226 P.2d 574, 579-81 (1951) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting and concurring); Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves' Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 21 Utah 2d 73,
76, 440 P.2d 872, 874 (1968) (Henriod, J., concurring); Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1043 (1962); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in
Naufragio, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1950).
145. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
146. See notes 204-07 infra and accompanying text.
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causation as well as negligence, 147 the court's basic reasoning was that of
alternative liability, buttressed by the fairness argument 48 later used in
Summers. Commentators have also justified the result in Ybarra on the basis
of the special responsibility of medical personnel for their patient's safety. 149
While only one was actively negligent, all the defendants owed the plaintiff a
duty "to see that no unnecessary harm came to him."' 150 This justification is
equally applicable to a finding of a joint liability in the DES cases, since
manufacturers also owe a special duty of care to members of the consuming
public. The consumer of DES who swallowed a pill relied on the manufactur-
ers' skills in research and their assurances of safety,' 5 1 just as the patient who
submits to an operation relies on the special skills and assurances of hospital
personnel.
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey made just such an
argument in extending the Ybarra holding to a manufacturer and a dis-
tributor. In Anderson v. Somberg, 152 the plaintiff was injured when a surgical
instrument broke off in his spinal canal during an operation. He sued the
doctor and hospital for negligence, the instrument's distributor for breach of
warranty, and its manufacturer in strict liability. While one of these parties
must have been the cause of injury, the evidence did not conclusively point to
the culpable one.' 5 3 The court held that something "akin"'' 54 to res ipsa
loquitur applied for all causes of action because of the "special responsibil-
ity" '55 of the manufacturer and distributor, as vell as of the other defendants,
to the patient. It also held that in such cases, where all possible defendants
were before the court, not only did the burden of proof shift to the defendants
but the jury must be instructed to find at least one defendant liable.' 56 It
reached this unprecedented holding because of the strong policy reasons
favoring the plaintiff's recovery.' 5 7 Equally strong reasons exist in the DES
cases.
Although the DES cases are directly comparable to Summers and to the
related groups of cases discussed above, the application of alternative liability
to the DES cases does require a modification of some of the elements present
147. The court was not entirely clear about the effect it gave to res ipsa loquitur, since it
referred to an inference but required that the inference be met by the defendants. 25 Cal. 2d at
494, 154 P.2d at 691. It was apparently applying the California mandatory inference, actually a
presumption, although Ybarra was decided before California's highest court officially held that res
ipsa loquitur was to be given this effect. See note 143 supra.
148. 25 Cal. 2d at 490-91, 154 P.2d at 689.
149. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 Calif. L. Rev. 369, 390 (1950).
150. 25 Cal. 2d at 491, 154 P.2d at 690.
151. For a discussion of the duty owed by all manufacturers to plaintiffs, see pt. IV(B) i~tfra.
152. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
153. Id. at 296, 338 A.2d at 4.
154. Id. at 300, 338 A.2d at 5 (quoting NOPCO Chem. Div. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 59 N.J. 274,
281 A.2d 793 (1971)).
155. Id. at 302, 338 A.2d at 7.
156. Id. at 302-03, 338 A.2d at 7.
157. Id. at 298, 338 A.2d at 5.
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in Summers and most similar cases. Consequently, those elements which will
be varied must be examined to determine whether a finding of joint and
several liability in the DES cases will still be logically and legally coherent.
The cause of action in Summers was negligence,'"8 while in DES, as in
most product liability cases, there are alternative causes of action. Strict
liability and warranty have dispensed with the element of fault and are based
on the presence of three factors-causation, defect, and injury. 5 9 It is
arguable that alternative liability, which effectively eliminates causation in
the sense that it cannot be ascribed to any one party, provides an insufficient
basis for joint liability under either of these causes of action. However, the
Restatement explicitly extends its application of Summers to all tortious
conduct1 60 and cases such as Anderson have applied a form of alternative
liability to strict liability and warranty causes of action.' 61 A court consider-
ing this extension would probably base its decision on the policy reasons for
finding liability. In the DES cases, this issue is moot, since the law appears to
set a negligence standard under all causes of action when the defective
product is a drug. 162
In Summers, all tortfeasors were before the court. In some of the DES cases
an attempt has been made to accomplish this, but others include only the
major manufacturers of DES. 163 Since it is probably impossible to bring suit
against all the tortfeasors,1 64 it should be permissible to join a relatively small
number of manufacturers, if those joined accounted for the great majority of
DES sales, and still apply alternative liability.
There are several arguments against allowing joinder of fewer than all
tortfeasors. First, if even one tortfeasor is absent, and it was he who actually
caused the plaintiff's injury, then only the "innocent" defendants may be held
liable. In any case, however, in which alternative liability is applied there
exists the probability of one or more "innocent" defendants being held liable.
This is allowable on policy grounds: no tortfeasor is actually innocent and it is
preferable for him to bear the loss which may have resulted from his
wrongdoing rather than for a completely innocent plaintiff to do so. A second
argument is that Summers created a presumption of causation which varied
the standard of preponderance of the evidence. Although the probability of
causation by any single defendant was 50% or less, this was balanced by the
certainty that one of the joined defendants was the cause. Since this variation
of the standard of proof depends on joinder of all defendants, arguably
joining fewer than all destroys the presumption. In answer, it may be pointed
158. 33 Cal. 2d at 83, 199 P.2d at 2.
159. See W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 103.
160. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B, Comment f (1965).
161. See, e.g., Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953) (implied warranty);
Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975) (warranty and
strict liability); NOPCO Chem. Div. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 59 N.J. 274, 281, 281 A.2d 793, 796
(1971) (express and impied warranty).
162. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 114-15 supra and accompanying text.
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out that the Restatement acknowledges that future cases may arise in which
some modification of the joinder requirement may be necessary. 165 In Hall,
which applied alternative liability in addition to concert, such a case did arise.
The court required only that plaintiffs "show by a preponderance of the
evidence"'166 that their injuries were caused by some one of the defendants.
Therefore, although Canadian-made blasting caps were sold in the United
States and no foreign manufacturers were joined in the suit, joinder of the
manufacturers responsible for the majority of domestic blasting cap sales
satisfied the plaintiffs' burden of proof. 167 It is suggested that, while the
Summers presumption should be modifiable, the court in Hall created too
great a modification by requiring only that plaintiffs show by a preponderance
of the evidence that one of the defendants was the cause. Where joinder of all
tortfeasors is difficult or practically impossible, and the equities favor the
imposition of liability, the proper standard for joinder should be "clear and
convincing evidence"' 68 that some one of the defendants caused the plaintiff's
injury. Precisely what proportion of the total market would be required in a
DES case would have to be determined by a court, but the market share
accounted for by defendants should be substantially greater than 50%. Such a
standard is not only logical, but realistic, since it is practically impossible for
all possible causes of any event to be before the court and ultimately any court
must be satisfied with the most probable causative agents.' 69
The Summers approach arguably requires that plaintiffs not be at fault for
the impossibility of identification, since otherwise it would be unjust to place
the burden of identifying the actual causative agent on the defendants.
Although it seems apparent that a DES plaintiff, unborn when her mother
took DES, is no more at fault for her inability to identify than was the
wounded plaintiff in Summers, defendants in one DES case have argued that
she is at fault. The reasons given were that the mother's choice of drug,
doctor, and pharmacist, the mother's records and her memory, were all more
within the control of plaintiff daughters than of defendants.' 7 0 This argument
seems fallacious for several reasons. Plaintiffs, as yet unborn, were certainly
not in control of the activities of their mothers. Furthermore, ascribing fault
to the women who took DES is a misrepresentation of the actual process by
which drugs are prescribed, a process which involves little choice by consum-
ers. 17' It is arguable that plaintiffs' mothers are no more blameworthy for
failing to notice or remember the exact pill they took than the plaintiff in
Summers for failing to notice who shot him.
In balancing the respective fault of plaintiff and defendants, a more
important consideration, and one emphasized by the Restatement, is whether
165. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B, Comment h (1965).
166. 345 F. Supp. 353, 379 (1972).
167. See id.
168. This standard is applied in those civil cases where "the party is required to establish [his
claim] by a more exacting measure of persuasion." C. McCormick, supra note 129, § 340, at 796.
169. See W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 41.
170. Abel, Defendants' Brief, supra note 1, at 20-21.
171. See notes 59-62 supra and accompanying text.
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it was the nature of the defendants' conduct and the resulting harm which
caused the plaintiff's inability to identify. 172 The manufacture under a variety
of trade names of a drug with delayed effects created a situation in which it
was unlikely that any identification could be made. Thus, the DES cases are
more compelling than Summers in this respect, since in Summers the conduct
which created impossibility of identification was the simultaneity of defen-
dants' shooting, not in itself tortious. With respect to DES, it is arguable that
the very tortiousness of defendants' conduct in failing to discover or warn of
the dangers of DES was the major reason why all parties failed to keep better
records or remember the drug prescribed, since they were unaware of any
reason to do SO. 17 3
The Summers court emphasized in dicta that defendants often are better
able to identify the cause of injury than the plaintiff. 174 This reasoning is a
concession to the usual justification given for allocating the burden of
proof, 175 and is not based on the realities. Just as the hunters in Summers had
no better access to such information than did the wounded plaintiff, so DES
manufacturers have no better access than do daughters with cancer. In most
such cases, causation is inexplicable by all parties and the allocation of the
burden of proof depends on other factors, such as fairness or the "disfavoring
[of] certain defenses. 11 76
In Summers, the events took place at one location simultaneously. In the
DES cases, defendants' conduct took place over a wide geographic area
during a period of years. The only reason to require unity of time and place in
an alternative liability case is to allow the defendants, who bear the burden of
proof, to see what happened and thus be able to identify the causative agent.
However, since generally none of the parties in cases of alternative causation
can identify the causative agent, this is an insufficient reason to require such
characteristics. The Restatement, which only mentions simultaneity as a
characteristic of the cases, recognized that passage of time in a particular
situation might necessitate a modification of this requirement. 7 7 The cases
have done so. 178 Furthermore, to require unity of time and place would be to
limit the Summers holding to a simple, nonindustrial world.
172. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B, Comment f (1965).
173. Cf. Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 773-74, 478 P.2d 465, 476, 91 Cal. Rptr.
745, 756 (1970) (making the same argument where defendant's unlawful failure to provide a
lifeguard resulted in plaintiff's inability to establish the proximate cause of decedents' death by
drowning).
174. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948).
175. C. McCormick, supra note 129, § 337, at 787. "This consideration [that a party has
better access to information] should not be overemphasized. Very often one must plead and prove
matters as to which his adversary has superior access to the proof." Id.; cf. Prosser, Res Ipsa
Loquitur: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 10 S. Cal. L. Rev. 459, 463-64 (1937) (if allocating the
burden of proof in res ipsa loquitur cases depended on superior knowledge "sheer ignorance might
be the most powerful weapon in the law").
176. C. McCormick, supra note 129, § 337, at 789.
177. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B, Comment h (1965).
178. In Hall there was neither unity of time nor place. See notes 112-13 supra and
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In Summers there were only two defendants; in Ybarra there were six, and
in Hall seven. In the DES cases as many as ninety-four defendants have been
joined, 179 although this Comment suggests that far fewer would be sufficient
for alternative liability to apply. The DES cases present the problem of
whether Summers can be applied to cases with a large number of defendants.
The greater the number, the less likely it is that any particular one of the
defendants was responsible for any particular injury. In Summers there was a
50% chance that either one of the two parties was responsible; in the DES
cases with ninety-four defendants, assuming an equal probability as to each
defendant, there is slightly more than a 1% chance of each defendant's
responsibility. Although joint liability may seem inequitable under these
circumstances, it need not be. Since there is not an equal possibility of
causation for each defendant, and the possibility of causation can best be
estimated by market share, damages should be apportioned according to
market share.' s0 If this were done, the amount of damages each defendant
would pay in the total number of DES cases would be approximately the
same whether identification were made or not, and the number of defendants
would be irrelevant. For example, if X Manufacturer sold one-fifth of all the
DES prescribed for pregnancy and identification could be made in all cases, X
would be the sole defendant in approximately one-fifth of all cases and liable
for all the damages in those cases. Under alternative liability, X would be
joined in all cases in which identification could not be made, but liable for
only one-fifth of the total damages in these cases. X would pay the same
amount either way. Although the correlation is not, in practice, perfect,' 8' it
is close enough so that defendants' objections on the ground of fairness lose
their value.
One question remains: how much and what type of evidence is required to
exculpate any single defendant from liability in the DES cases? This was not
specified in Summers or the cases following it, but it is possible that in
Summers a 51% probability of liability for one defendant might have excul-
pated the other. Such a result is arguably inequitable in the context of the
Summers case, and clearly so in the DES cases, which differ from Summers in
that the evidence on market share is statistical. Although it has been urged
that in the DES cases plaintiff's burden is satisfied by joining those manufac-
turers responsible for a high percentage of sales, 18 2 there is nothing to stop
defendants from joining as many additional defendants as they are able, who
accompanying text. In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (Sth Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), which was a case of concurrent causation rather than
alternative liability, but otherwise analogous to the DES cases, defendants' actions were not
simultaneous. See note 136 supra.
179. See notes 3, 29 supra and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of apportionment, see notes 208-11 infra and accompanying text.
181. There are not enough DES cases for an exact correlation, nor will all cases with multiple
defendants join the same defendants. Since the defendanLs joined will also not account for 100%
of the market, but will have to pay 100% jointly of the damages, their share of damages will not
be precisely the same as their share of the market.
182. See notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text.
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would then be proportionately liable for damages. A defendant should not be
able to exculpate itself if it had a 2% market share and another defendant had
75% of the market. Carried to its logical conclusion, such exculpation could
result in one manufacturer, if it had a sufficient market share, being liable for
all damages in all DES cases. It is therefore suggested that only evidence
unrelated to market share be exculpatory. For example, if a plaintiff's mother
took red pills in Milwaukee in 1955, all defendants whose products were not
sold in Milwaukee in that year or were any other color than red could remove
themselves from the action.
IV. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
A. The Theory
Enterprise liability as proposed here combines the better features of concert
and alternative liability into one coherent theory. It can result in the joint and
several liability of all the industry members that manufactured an identically
defective product. The theory would be available to plaintiffs who cannot or
might not be able to identify the actual causative agent of their injury. In all
other instances it would be unavailable because traditional tort law would be
sufficient to fix liability. The elements of enterprise liability are:
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative agent
and such liability is due to the nature of the defendants' conduct.
2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured by all the
defendants.
3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect.
4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was a
member.
5) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury was caused
by the product of some one of the defendants. For example, the joined
defendants accounted for a high percentage of such defective products
on the market at the time of plaintiff's injury.
6) There existed an insufficient, industrywide standard of safety as to the
manufacture of this product.
7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of whichever
cause of action is proposed: negligence, warranty, or strict liability.
Once plaintiff proves these elements, the burden of proof as to causation shifts
to defendants, each of which can exonerate itself only by showing, according
to the standards of proof already proposed, that its product could not have
been the one which injured this particular plaintiff.' 83 Defendants, of course,
may also attempt to disprove any and all elements of plaintiff's case.
Damages will be apportioned among those defendants found liable in propor-
tion to their market shares.
Enterprise liability has been developed specifically to solve the problem of
causation encountered in the DES cases and cases analogous to them-the
plaintiff's inability to identify the manufacturer that sold the defective prod-
uct that resulted in her injury. It is suggested that policy requires, as between
183. See pt. III(B) supra.
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an innocent plaintiff and a group of tortfeasors, that the plaintiff's loss be
placed on the tortfeasors. Traditional tort law, however, may prove inade-
quate to solve the problem of causation in DES cases. Plaintiffs might not be
able to meet the concerted action requirement of a "tacit understanding"
among the manufacturers. 184 The elements of alternative liability, particu-
larly those requiring only a few tortfeasors, all of which are before the court,
are sufficiently distorted that it virtually becomes a different theory.185 It is
therefore suggested that a new theory be designed to fit the facts in the DES
cases by combining elements of alternative liability 186 and concert. 187 Enter-
prise liability is derived from alternative liability because its basic premise is
that some one of the defendants probably caused, in the traditional sense, the
plaintiff's injury. Therefore, any defendant who can show that his product
could not have caused the injury, even though he also adhered to inadequate
industry standards, may exculpate himself. Such exculpation would not be
allowed under the concert approach.1 88 Enterprise and alternative liability are
also alike because the primary purpose of both theories is to cure plaintiff's
inability to identify the injurious product, and both accomplish this purpose
by shifting the burden of proof of causation to defendants.
Unlike the theory of alternative liability, however, enterprise liability
emphasizes certain activities of the industry as a whole-adherence to an
inadequate safety standard and manufacture of an identically defective prod-
uct. It is submitted that, in an ethical and a legal sense, this group behavior
resulted in the plaintiffs' injuries. This focus on the joint activities of industry
members is analogous to the "agreement" requirement in concert cases, and
also reflects the purpose of those cases-to deter similar behavior in the
future. Unlike concert, however, the parallel behavior of defendants, absent
any understanding among them, is sufficient to prove this element.
The justification for concluding that each defendant is a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff's injury under enterprise liability is also derived from a combination
of the explanations of causation in concert and alternative liability. The
primary model is alternative liability, as it was modified earlier in this
Comment.' 89 Accordingly, cause-in-fact results from the fictional presumption
that each defendant is the cause because, jointly, there is a high prob-
ability-clear and convincing evidence-that the product manufactured
by some one of the defendants, all of which behaved tortiously, caused the
specific plaintiff's injury. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is
met by joining those manufacturers that accounted for a high percentage of
the defective products on the market, approximately 75% to 80%. This
standard of evidence is less demanding than the traditional Summers pre-
184. See notes 101-09 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 163-69, 179-81 supra and accompanying text,
186. See pt. II(B) supra.
187. See pt. III(A) supra.
188. No defendant that participated in the concerted plan or activity is exonerated from
liability for its result. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text.
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sumption which requires all tortfeasors to be joined. The Summers theory is
also diluted because, by joining so many defendants, the probability that any
one was the cause-in-fact is lessened.1 90 On the other hand, plaintiff must
prove an additional element in enterprise liability, not found in Summers, one
that is derived from the concerted activities of the defendants: an insufficient
industrywide safety standard. Industry custom has generally been used by
courts as evidence to determine whether an industry member has met the
proper standard of care, although such evidence has not been conclusive.' 9 '
In Hall, however, the court suggested in dicta that adherence to an inade-
quate industry standard might be a lesser form of concert because it indi-
cated joint control of risk, the basis for a finding of concert. 192 Analyzed in
terms of causation, the industrywide standard becomes itself the cause of
plaintiff's injury, just as defendants' joint plan is the cause of injury in the
traditional concert of action plea. Each defendant's adherence perpetuates this
standard, which results in the manufacture of the particular, unidentifiable
injury-producing product. Therefore, each industry member has contributed
to plaintiff's injury. Proof of this standard alone would be too weak a form of
concert to justify a finding that each industry member was a substantial cause
of plaintiff's injury and therefore jointly and severally liable.' 93 However, the
addition of this explanation of causation to the weakened presumption
derived from Summers should be sufficient to shift the burden of proof on the
issue of causation to the defendants under enterprise liability.
Both Hall and Ybarra provide precedent for enterprise liability. Hall's
major contribution is that, in a case similar on its facts to the DES cases, it
proposed and provided a rationale for a theory of industrywide liability194
190. However, apportionment of damages largely cures this defect. See notes 179-81 supra
and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Eastern
Transp. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932); see W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 33,
at 166-68.
192. 345 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 376-78. This rationale has been relied on to some extent in pt. IV(B) infra. The
dicta, as well as the holding, in Hall are predicated on an assumption of "the existence of a
national body of state tort law." Id. at 360. Consequently, both Hall's theory of enterprise
liability and its holding have been criticized as not complying with the rule in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Abel, Defendants' Brief, supra note 1, at 26. Erie states that
"[tlhere is no federal general common law" for the purposes of substantive decisions in diversity
cases. 304 U.S. at 78. However, in Hall, Judge Weinstein assumed a national tort law in order to
determine whether defendants were entitled to a dismissal, because he did not yet have enough
information to settle the complex choice of law questions that the case presented. 345 F. Supp. at
360. He could have simply refused to consider defendants' motion for dismissal until he had
received more information on the choice of law issue and so have reached the same result.
Instead, he went beyond what was necessary and proposed a novel theory of joint liability. Since
there were a number of jurisdictions whose law might ultimately control, id., the assumption of a
body of national tort law may be viewed as meaning that some of the applicable state law might
allow the plaintiffs' cause of action. Since California, which decided Summers, Ybarra, and the
cases discussed in notes 92-100supra and accompanying text, was one of these states, this was not
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where the industry members were "the most strategically placed participants
in a risk-creating process," 9 5 although only one of them could have "di-
rectly"'196 caused each plaintiff's injury. Hall's major defect is that, while it
provided policy reasons for such an imposition of liability, it neither recog-
nized nor analyzed the problems of cause-in-fact implicit in the court's theory,
nor in its decision. Therefore, although the court in Hall proposed several
working models for enterprise liability, each combining elements of concert
and alternative liability, 197 these combinations are not logically defensible
when analyzed in terms of cause-in-fact. For example, the court apparently
decided that the plaintiff's allegations of an explicit agreement among defen-
dants to join in a tortious activity 98 were sufficient to state a claim because
they constituted a "classic" plea of concerted action. 199 However, citing
Summers and section 433B(3) of the Restatement, the court then required that
plaintiffs also show "by a preponderance of the evidence .. .that the caps
an unwarranted assumption. See 345 F. Supp. at 360. Judge Weinstein's "national" tort law was
also clearly meant as an assumption of general tort principles of the kind that are taught in law
schools throughout the country. It was on such principles that he based his theory of enterprise
liability; its acceptance by any jurisdiction would obviously depend on the law of that jurisdic-
tion.
Critics of Hall have also stated that its theory was subsequently retracted by Judge Weinstein
in Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See Abel,
Defendants' Brief, supra note 1, at 26. In Chance, the court severed the various actions In tile
case and transferred them to the federal district courts sitting in the states where the accidents
had occurred. (It should be remembered that Chance (345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)) was the
actual case, of the two cases consolidated in Hall, for which enterprise liability was proposed. See
note 81 supra and accompanying text.) In response, it should be pointed out that the decision was
based on the absence of any meaningful joint activities of the industry members in New York,
and on the substantial interests of the situs states. 371 F. Supp. at 445-46. Judge Weinstein had
anticipated the possibility of severance in Hall. See 345 F. Supp. at 386. Neither the decision nor
the rationale of Hall were retracted by the severance in Chance, 371 F. Supp. 439, nor by the
statement there that the cases should not be tried in New York on a "federal torts standard." Id.
at 448. This was simply a recognition of the Erie rule. Se id. It should also be noted that the
court in Chance did not dismiss any of the plaintiffs' claims, although the defendants had moved
for dismissal again. Id. at 451.
The severed cases never dealt with the issue of enterprise liability. In two, the statutes of
limitations had run. Lehtonen v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 389 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mont.
1975) (motion to dismiss granted); Davis v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1347
(W.D.N.C. 1974) (summary judgment granted). In the third, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury
verdict rejecting the plaintiff's negligence claim, and affirmed the lower court's directed verdict
against plaintiff's strict liability claim on grounds unrelated to enterprise liability, since plaintiff
did identify the manufacturer in this suit. Ball v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 519 F.2d 715
(6th Cir. 1975).
195. 345 F. Supp. at 376.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 374, 378. In addition, the court's decision that a showing of concert would also
require a shift in the burden of proof of causation to defendant also suggests a combination of
concert and alternative liability. See notes 199-202 infra and accompanying text.
198. 345 F. Supp. at 374.
199. Id. at 373-74.
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involved in the accidents were the products of the named defendant-
manufacturers,"'20 0 whereupon plaintiffs would be relieved of the burden of
proving causation and this burden would shift to defendants.20 1 However, if
plaintiffs' allegations of concert were to be believed, defendants' participation
in the concerted plan was sufficient to arrive at causation, and there was no
necessity for any additional proof.202
Ybarra is noteworthy because, like Hall, in a situation where plaintiff could
not identify the injury-producing tortfeasor, the court seemed to justify its
finding of causation on the grounds of alternative liability and concert.
Although Summers is generally credited with having created alternative
liability, Ybarra, which was decided earlier, is clearly a variant of that theory
in a res ipsa loquitur context. 20 3 However, the finding of causation in Ybarra
can also be viewed as based on concert.2 0 4 The court itself briefly referred to
the "highly integrated system of activities 2 0 - in modern hospitals, and to the
fact that "doctors and nurses in attendance [could but did not] voluntarily
[choose] to disclose the identity of the negligent person .... "206 This latter fact
has been elaborated by commentators into the theory of a conspiracy of silence
among the hospital personnel. 20 7 If, however, the concerted action in Ykarra
was the joint silence of all defendants, this took place after the injury had
occurred and could not have been its cause. Thus, Ybarra's theory of concert
does not explain causation, nor did the court in Ybarra attempt to relate con-
cert to its predominant holding of alternative liability. The theory of enter-
prise liability proposed in this Comment builds on the foundation laid by
both these cases, but attempts to combine the theories of concert and
alternative liability in a more satisfactory fashion than did either case.
Much of the strength and justice of enterprise liability rests in the sugges-
tion that damages be apportioned among defendants in proportion to their
market shares. Since enterprise liability results in joint and several liability,
each defendant is liable for the whole amount of the damages.20 Because
contribution exists in the majority of jurisdictions,20 9 damages in fact will
200. Id. at 379.
201. Id. at 380.
202. The court may be presumed to have required this additional proof in recognition of its
unique use of concert to cure plaintiffs' inability to identify specific manufacturers of the
injury-producing products. See id. at 383. However, if this is the court's reasoning, it is never
explained.
203. See notes 145-51 supra and accompanying text. Ybarra is cited in Summers as precedent
for its theory of alternative liability. 33 Cal. 2d at 86-87, 199 P.2d at 4.
204. The California Supreme Court later stated that Ybarra was based on concert. Clark v.
Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 411, 426 P.2d 525, 533, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 133 (1967).
205. 25 Cal. 2d at 493, 154 P.2d at 691.
206. Id. at 490, 154 P.2d at 689.
207. See W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 39, at 223; Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1043, 1051 (1962).
208. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 47, at 297-98.
209. The common law rule, generally followed until relatively recently in the United States.
did not allow contribution among joint tortfeasors. Id. § 50. The Uniform Contribution Among
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generally be divided among the defendants. Unfortunately, only a minority of
jurisdictions recognizes a comparative form of contribution where the amount
of damages each defendant pays is based on the degree to which each
defendant caused plaintiff's injury,2 10 although such contribution is more
equitable where the degree of responsibility among defendants is ascertainably
unequal. It is suggested that comparative contribution should exist in enter-
prise liability, for the reasons discussed earlier. 2 11
B. Policy
The primary reason advanced thus far for the plaintiff's recovery in the
DES cases has been an equitable one-that as between the innocent plaintiff
and the tortfeasors, the tortfeasors should bear the cost of injury.2 12 While
this is the basic policy behind enterprise liability, it is a simplistic approach to
a complex issue, There are a number of arguments favoring the imposition of
enterprise liability in DES, which are in line with twentieth-century thought
in tort law.
Tortfeasors Act of 1939, which was revised in 1955, does allow contribution. Eighteen states have
adopted the Act. 12 Uniform Laws Ann. 57, 34 app. (1975 & Supp. 1978). Other states not
adopting the Uniform Act have also passed statutes permitting contribution among joint
tortfeasors. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 875 (West Supp. 1977); Ga. Code Ann. § 37-303
(1962); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 412.030 (1970); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2925a (Supp. 1977); N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Law § 1401 (McKinney 1976); Va. Code § 8.01-34 (1950); W. Va. Code § 55-7-13
(1966). See also the comparative contribution state statutes cited in note 210 ittfra. Still other
states accord judicial recognition to contribution among joint tortfeasors. See, e.g., Bedell v.
Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W.
1048 (1918). In federal courts in diversity suits, state law i6 applied. 18 Am. Jur. 2d Contribution
§ 45 (1965). In the absence of comparative contribution, see note 210 infra and accompanying
text, a state allowing contribution will apportion damages "pro rata," or equally, among
defendants found liable. See, e.g., Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955, § l(b), 12
Uniform Laws Ann. 63 (1975).
210. Some states have recognized comparative contribution by statute. See, e.g., Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 34-1002(4) (1947); Del. Code tit. 10, § 6302(d) (1974); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-12 (1976);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1402 (McKinney 1976); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 15-8-15 (1967); Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978). Several jurisdictions have recognized
comparative contribution judically. See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Forth Corp. v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 421 U.S. 978 (1975)
(federal law); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir 1967) (federal law); Stevens v. Silver
Mfg. Co., No. 48974 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1977), 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 7778; Skinner v.
Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., No. 48757 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1977), 2 Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 7742; Robinson v. Int'l Harvester Co., No. 49205 (ll. Sup. Ct. 1977), 2 Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) 8065; Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Packard v. Whitten,
274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
The statutes and cases recognizing comparative contribution generally refer to apportionment
by degree of "fault." E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1002(4) (1947). This apparently means, however,
that damages are apportioned according to the degree to which defendants caused the injury, and
not the degree to which the defendants' conduct was tortious. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d
at 9, 114 N.W.2d at 109; Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184, § 1[a] (1973).
211. See notes 179-81 supra and accompanying text.
212. See notes 123-27, 140, 148 supra and accompanying text.
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The proposed theory of enterprise liability holds liable defendants that,
according to traditional notions, are not really at fault. In addition, not only
are the defendants not in privity with the plaintiff in the usual sense, but all
defendants except the one that actually sold the injury-producing product are
not even in the vertical chain of distribution. Therefore, privity is absent even
in the most extended sense. The absence of fault and privity, however, are
not without precedent. Modern theories of tort law that remove the necessity
for either provide theoretical support for enterprise liability, and justifications
for its existence.
The doctrine of respondeat superior, which Hall suggested is related to
enterprise liability,213 holds a master liable for the torts of his servant although
the master is not in privity with the injured third party and is innocent of any
tortious behavior himself.214 Respondeat superior is not a recent form of
liability, and, although numerous "ingenious 2 s15 explanations of it have been
advanced over the years, "the modern justification for vicarious liability is a
rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of risk. The losses caused by the torts of
the employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of
the employer's enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required
cost of doing business. '21 6 The employer, who derives a profit from the
enterprise, is the party best able to absorb and distribute its foreseeable costs
to the public. He is also in the best position to take preventive measures.
2 17
In the past twenty years the advent of strict liability has largely abolished
the requirements for privity and fault in products liability. 2 18 The manufac-
turer has been the focal point for liability, 21 9 although he has "exercised all
possible care" 220 and "entered into [no] contractual relation" with the user.22 1
The policy reasons advanced for strict liability of the seller are identical with
those for respondeat superior. 222
213. 345 F. Supp. at 376.
214. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 68, § 26.1; W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 69.
215. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 69, at 459.
216. Id. (footnote omitted).
217. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 68, §§ 26.1, 26.5; W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 69.
Most of the same arguments have also been made in favor of another form of no-fault liability,
workmen's compensation laws. See New York Central R.R. v. White. 243 U.S. 188, 202-05
(1917); 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra § 11.2; W. Prosser, supra § 80.
218. See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Mlinn. L. Rev. 791 (1966); Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
219. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 260-61, 391 P.2d 168,
170-71, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898-99 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); James, General Products-
Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923 (1957).
220. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
221. Id. § 402A(2)(b).
222. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(Traynor, 3., concurring); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, Comment c (1975); Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499, 517 (1961);
Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951), reprinted in 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1422, 1472-74
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Enterprise liability can be justified on the same policy grounds as respon-
deat superior and strict liability. Where an entire industry, engaged in a
predictably dangerous enterprise223 and following similar safety practices,
places an identically defective product in the stream of commerce, the
industry rather than the individual manufacturer should be the focal point for
liability because it can best allocate risks, distribute costs, and take preventive
measures. Under these circumstances, privity and the conventional notion of
fault are dispensable. Therefore, like respondeat superior and strict liability,
enterprise liability shifts liability from the one in privity to the parties best
able to satisfy these policy goals. While the first two shift liability vertically,
from employee to employer and from retailer to wholesaler to manufacturer,
enterprise liability shifts it horizontally, from one manufacturer to a group of
manufacturers. This horizontal shift is a unique feature of enterprise liability,
because the majority of the defendants are consequently not in the chain of
distribution of the actual injury-producing product. However, this feature can
be considered merely an extension of the theories of respondeat superior and
strict liability-the next step in the removal of the requirements of fault and
privity.
Enterprise liability is also similar to strict liability in that scientific and
industrial advances necessitate both theories. Justice Traynor, in his land-
mark concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 22 4 stated that
the strict requirements of negligence could no longer be met because the
complexities of modern manufacture, as opposed to the comparative simplic-
ity of earlier handicraft, were "inaccessible" to the consumer. 225 He urged the
adoption of strict liability because "[t]he manufacturer's obligation to the
consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship between them
.... "226 Technological advances and current market conditions now allow an
entire industry to manufacture a complex fungible product; modern scientific
research can link contact with this product to harmful effects after a sig-
nificant lapse of time. Since these advances now make identification of the
injury-producing product inaccessible to the consumer, the manufacturer's
obligation to the consumer can only be met by some new form of liability.
(1966); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 153 (1976);
Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 Yale L.J. 1172, 1175-79 (1952); cf.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1060-74
(1972) (liable party should be one who is best able to make cost-benefit analysis of accident costs);
Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 Harv L. Rev. 401, 433-36 (1959) (insured
party should be liable, but moral standards more important than risk distribution in strict
liability); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972) (negligence system Itself
based on cost analysis and accident prevention).
223. See notes 229-30 infra and accompanying text. The fact that the manufacture of drugs Is
predictably dangerous suggests an analogy between the imposition of enterprise liability on the
drug industry and liability for "inherently dangerous" activities such as blasting. See Hall v. E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See generally W. Prosser,
supra note 18, § 71, at 472-74.
224. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 !1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
226. Id.
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C. Application of Enterprise Liability to the DES Cases
The DES cases are ideal for this first application of enterprise liability
because the drug industry rather than the individual manufacturer is so
clearly the proper focal point for liability. It was the industry, and not
individual manufacturers, which did not meet the "normal expectations 1 227 of
society in manufacturing DES. Through imitative drug research, joint sub-
mission of clinical data, and parallel, possibly imitative, marketing prac-
tices, 228 the industry adhered to an industrywide inadequate safety standard.
Therefore the industry as a whole is responsible for consumer reliance on the
safety of DES, its widespread use, and the resulting injuries.
The party best able to predict injury and pay claims is also the industry
itself, rather than particular manufacturers. Drugs rank high as a cause of
consumer injuries, both in frequency and severity. 22 9 Consequently, cata-
strophic drug injuries are predictable events,2 30 although exactly which in-
juries will result is not. Industrywide statistics on drug injury have been
compiled23 1 and presumably are used by insurance companies in order to
determine product liability insurance rates. Additionally, large drug manufac-
turers presently cooperate with each other and the federal government to
jointly set industrywide loss control standards. 2"3 Even greater centralization
of statistical data seems possible in the near future, as does the initiation of
centralized payment of claims. In view of dramatically rising product liability
insurance premiums2 33 and drug manufacturers' difficulty in obtaining such
227. Klemme, supra note 222, at 180. Klemme proposed that failure to meet the "normal
expectations" of the persons involved is one criterion in the choice of the best 'but for" cause of
an injury. Id. at 180-82. The term "enterprise liability" as used by Klemme does not have the
same meaning as that used in this Comment.
228. See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
229. Drug injuries ranked 14th in a list of the 25 worst consumer product injuries of 1975,
with combined frequency-severity values assigned to each injury. I Gordon Assoc., Inc., Product
Liability: Final Report of the Industry Study EI-25 (Interagency Task Force on Product liability,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce PB-265-542, 1977) (Table I11-6) [hereinafter cited as Industry Study).
Although the drug injuries reported in 1975 represented only 1.4% of all reported product
injuries, id. at 111-27 (Table 111-7), they ranked among the highest in severity, id. at I-26. It
should also be noted that the majority of drug reactions are never reported because of the
consumer's or doctor's failure to recognize the relationship between drug and symptom, the
doctor's reluctance to report, the absence of an adequate reporting mechanism, and the occasional
concealment of adverse effects by drug manufacturers. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription
Drug Injuries, 59 Va. L. Rev. 1, 4-7 (1973). The United States Public Health Service has
estimated one million nonfatal drug reactions per year. Id. at 3. By 1960, it was estimated some
40 new diseases were produced by therapeutic drugs. Id.
230. 1 McKinsey & Co., Product Liability: Final Report of the Insurance Study 3-34
(Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, U.S. Dep't of Commerce PB-263-600, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Insurance Study].
231. For example, the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) compiled the
statistics used in the Department of Commerce publication cited in note 229 supra. See I Industry
Study, supra note 229, at I-22.
232. 1 Insurance Study, supra note 230, at 3-34.
233. The cost of that part of their comprehensive general liability premiums attributed to
product liability coverage by pharmaceutical companies quadrupled between 1971 and 1976. 2
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insurance,2 34 several pharmaceutical concerns have established "captive"
insurance companies.2 35 In other words, they have become self-insurers. It
has recently been suggested that the entire industry establish a captive
insurance company, which would mean a sharing of risks industrywide.
236
West Germany, which by law requires product liability insurance for drug
companies, sets the example of another method of centralizing data and
risk-a pool set up by insurance companies to underwrite pharmaceutical
products liability. 237 Either alternative would be more likely to provide
coverage for drug companies, be more economic, and probably be more
efficient than the present system of insurance in the United States. The
implementation of such innovations in insurance would be hastened by the
adoption of enterprise liability.
Where generically similar drugs are manufactured industrywide, preven-
tion of injury can best be undertaken by the entire industry rather than by the
individual manufacturer. Under the present system, unification already exists
through the FDA which gathers and interprets safety data supplied to it by
the drug industry before and after N.D.A.'s are issued.238 The FDA's testing
requirements before approval of N.D.A.'s are much more comprehensive than
they were at the time DES was first manufactured.2 3 9 However, the FDA
post-marketing reporting system for adverse reactions has been severely
criticized. 240 This reporting system is a major FDA function because serious
side effects, which frequently have a low incidence or take years to develop,
often do not manifest themselves until a drug has been widely marketed.
24 1 It
Industry Study, supra note 229, at A-132. The study warns that it was unable to validate these
estimates. Id. at A-3. Some of the rise in cost must be attributed to inflation during those years.
Also, "rate increases that seem huge when viewed in isolation are not nearly so huge when viewed
as percentage of sales ...... 1 Insurance Study, supra note 230, at ES-4. Recent premium
increases, in some part due to a correction for past rate inadequacy, are not expected to rise as
rapidly in the future. Id.
234. 1 Insurance Study, supra note 230, at 3-34.
235. Id. at 3-34 to 3-35. See generally Comment, Federal Taxation Concepts in Corporate
Risk Assumption: Self-Insurance, the Trust, and the Captive Insurance Company, 46 Fordham
L. Rev. 781 (1978).
236. Business Insurance, May 16, 1977, at 16, col. 5.
237. 1 Insurance Study, supra note 230, at 3-36.
238. M. Dixon, supra note 2, §§ 5.04, 5.05.
239. More stringent FDA requirements for approval of a new drug were instituted by the
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1970)).
Because the Secretary of HEW has authority to exempt drugs from these requirements so that
they may be investigated for safety and efficacy prior to approval under 21 U.S.C § 355(i) (1970),
comprehensive regulations governing such exemptions have been promulgated. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 130.3 (1972). The 1962 regulations have resulted in an increase in the cost of investigating new
drugs and in the length of time before a new drug can be marketed, as well as in a decrease in the
number of new drugs approved yearly. See W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, Regulation and Drug
Development 19-25, 45-47 (1975); Spark, Breaking the Drug Barrier, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1977,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 64.
240. M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 6.09; W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, supra note 239, at 140. Of
the 12 countries registered with the World Health Organization's Drug Monitoring System, the
U.S. has one of the lowest reporting rates. Id.
241. W. Wardell & L. Lasagna, supra note 239, at 139; Merrill, supra note 229, at 17-20.
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has been suggested that, in view of the stringent FDA requirements on drug
manufacturers to warn of known or suspected dangers, it is to the manufac-
turers' advantage not to improve this reporting system. 242 The imposition of
enterprise liability would provide incentive to the industry for such improve-
ment, since there would be instances in which it would be liable as a whole.
For example, in addition to urging better mechanisms for reporting adverse
reactions to the manufacturers than now exist, 24 3 the industry could establish
its own system to collect and collate such reports. This might well be more
efficient than waiting for the overworked FDA244 to coordinate the data it
receives.
Economic criteria have already been discussed as significant in the choice of
best risk bearer. These are: choice of that enterprise which can best absorb
the loss and distribute it most widely, and choice of that enterprise which can
distribute the loss to those who benefited from the injury-producing enter-
prise. 2 4 5 A choice of the entire drug industry meets these criteria as well as or
better than the individual manufacturer, or the injured plaintiff if no liability
were to be found.
The drug industry can best absorb and distribute the loss. Although its
profits have decreased in recent years, the industry is a financially healthy
one.246 It is either protected by insurance, albeit at rising costs, or capable of
self-insuring. 247 The small manufacturers, which are most susceptible to
rising liability and insurance costs, 248 may even be protected by enterprise
liability, which is aimed at the largest producers with the major share of the
market-the giant drug companies. Claiming that money would be diverted
from research and development of new drugs, 249 the drug industry would
242. See M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 6.09.
243. There is presently no mandatory system imposed on doctors or hospitals to report
adverse drug reactions to either the manufacturers or the FDA. Id.; Merrill, supra note 229, at
110 n.396. The industry could urge the adoption of such a system.
244. See Spark, supra note 239, at 65.
245. These criteria consolidate the theories of the sources cited in note 222 supra. Probably
the clearest and most comprehensive statement of these criteria is in Kiemme, supra note 222.
One criterion has been omitted-that the preferred risk bearer is the one who can best allocate
resources. Allocation of resources means the charging of an industry with its hidden costs,
including the cost of injuries, in order to insure that goods are valued at their true cost. In a free
enterprise system, this theoretically results in the proper functioning of the system of supply and
demand. Calabresi, supra note 222, at 500-07; Klemme, supra at 158-61. This criterion has been
omitted because it has no relevance to the drug industry. Drugs are not supply-demand products,
nor do their prices accurately reflect their costs. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text.
Consequently, while charging the cost of DES-produced injuries to the pharmaceutical industry
might be reflected in prices, it would still not result in drugs being valued at their true cost.
Neither would price increases be likely to affect the demand for prescription drugs.
246. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
247. See notes 233-35 supra and accompanying text.
248. 1 Insurance Study, supra note 230, at ES-7, 3-35.
249. This is the argument the industry makes to all increases in governmental regulation.
Merrill, supra note 229, at 117. Merrill's discussion of why increased liability for the manufactur-
ers would not inhibit research is interesting. See id. at 117-20.
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obviously resist an increase in its liability costs through the imposition of
enterprise liability. In fact, the drug industry has been criticized for expending
its research money on unimportant variants of existing drugs rather than on
basic research, which raises the question of how much pharmaceutical re-
search is for the public's benefit and how much is simply for profit regard-
less of benefit. 250 Since drug manufacturers do not spend a large percent-
age of their total sales on research2 51 and spend a great deal on pro-
motion, 25 2 their concern with the effect of additional costs on research is
suspect. This claim is also fallacious because the industry can absorb the cost
of higher liability through higher prices; and since demand is relatively
inelastic, the industry can retain its present profit margins. To the extent that
liability might reduce profit, the industry would be forced to reevaluate and
reallocate its presently wasteful research efforts to the public's benefit. As for
distribution, the drug industry can obviously distribute the tort loss more
widely than individual manufacturers or the plaintiffs. It does so primarily by
raising prices.
Analyzed narrowly, the criterion that the ultimate cost of the loss be borne
by those who have benefited from the risk-producing enterprise is difficult to
meet. Since DES was probably ineffective in preventing miscarriages, 2 5 3
neither the women who took it nor their daughters benefited from the drug.
Therefore, placing the tort loss on the daughters does not satisfy this goal.
Even had DES been effective, its tort cost cannot now be distributed to
pregnant women through a retroactive raise in price, since DES is no longer
on the market for use in pregnancy. Therefore, placing the loss on the
individual manufacturer will not result in distributing the cost to these
women. However, distribution through pricing is, in the broadest sense, a
distribution of cost to the industry's beneficiaries-the drug-buying public.
Enterprise liability thus does satisfy the criterion of distributing cost to the
enterprise's beneficiaries. Attaching liability to the entire industry also distrib-
utes it to those few who did actually benefit from the manufacture of
DES-investors and employees.
250. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. The Senate Committee on Small Business
commented: "When two or more firms stand to gain financially from being first with products
that can be effectively promoted to prescribers, the likelihood of duplicative research efforts is
strong and, from the consumer's standpoint, undoubtedly wasteful. 'Research' that has as Its
objective merely the circumvention of existing patent barriers, or which is intended only to
provide firms with vehicles for market competition, probably results in costs that consumers must
bear without the comparable benefits of real product improvement." Senate Report, supra note
38, at 31. Other critics note that the consumer is being cheated of more than his money. "Since
the profit motive is the basic guideline for research, ... the manufacturers spend most of their
research money on only the most common disease entities. . . .Consequently, there are many
seriously debilitating diseases which would justify the idealistic research suggested by Industry
publicity, but which now are starved for research funds." M. Dixon, supra note 2, § 6.03, at 6-6.
251. See Senate Report, supra note 38, at 31 (chart listing estimated research expenditures for
1969-71 of 13 large drug companies and the percentage of their sales that this represented:
percentage of sales ranged from 2.6% to 12.0%).
252. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
253. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The DES cases present a gap in tort law. Liability as to multiple defen-
dants, only one of which directly caused injury, cannot be found under
present law unless either the theory of concert or of alternative liability is
stretched beyond its current limits. Although this Comment has attempted to
develop both these concepts logically to a point where they can be applied to
the DES cases, application of either theory is makeshift. Therefore enterprise
liability, a third theory involving aspects of both, is advocated for adoption by
the courts in the DES cases.
The DES cases are only the tip of an iceberg. As technology and science
advance, there will be more products liability and analogous cases in which
the injured party will be unable to identify the specific cause of his injury. 25 4
Society faces a choice in these cases: it can either leave the injury where
it falls as the price of modern technology;, provide sporadic compensation
through the application of current tort theories; or adopt a new legal theory
which enables it to compensate uniformly. It is suggested that, where such
injuries are the result of an entire industry's activity, the industry rather than
the injured individual should bear the loss. Enterprise liability accomplishes
this. An enlightened tort law should be able to adjust itself to the equities and
the economic realities that the DES cases present.
Enterprise liability suggests more than it proposes. Most of the policy
arguments advanced in favor of industrywide liability, where the entire
industry has concertedly manufactured an identical, defective product, are
equally valid even where an injured plaintiff can identify the cause of his
injury. Such liability is the logical extension of the more limited liability
proposed in this Comment. Understandably, enterprise liability has not been
urged in such a situation because existing tort law, which is still firmly
grounded in fault and conventional notions of causation, can reach an
equitable result. An even greater extension than enterprise liability would be
no-fault insurance for all product injuries, subsidized by manufacturers and
available to consumers solely on proof of causation of injury by a product. 255
Such solutions are in the province of the legislatures; it is not the function of
the courts to propose such broad extensions of liability. It is the courts'
business to weigh the equities between the parties before it and where these
permit, to compensate tort victims. Enterprise liability permits them to do so
in DES and similar cases.
Naomi Sheiner
254. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
255. See Baynes, Liability for Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations and
Some Reflections on the Swine Flu Experience, 21 St. Louis U.L.J. 44, 70-73 & n.173 (1977).
Baynes suggests that the swine-flu experience, in which the government underwrote the manufac-
turers' losses, might provide a model for no-fault legislative solutions in future mass immuniza-
tion situations. Id. at 74-75.
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